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The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) is 
required to provide an economic analysis of proposed 
regulations and to show they plausibly meet a cost-benefit 
test. It recently proposed Regulation Best Interest (RBI) to 
replace the longstanding suitability rule for securities brokers 
when providing their retail clients with incidental investment 
advice. Despite a dearth of empirical support, the proposing 
release concludes that a best interest standard would better 
mitigate the conflicts of interest brokers face between 
providing their clients with impartial advice and inflating 
their own compensation. The empirical vacuum is a result of 
the SEC’s failure to ask the right economic question, which 
Nobel laureate Ronald Coase raised over half a century ago: 
why does the rule of liability matter? What transaction costs 
prevent the parties—who in this setting negotiate face-to-
face—from correcting any market failure through private 
ordering? This essay provides a transaction cost assessment 
of RBI and concludes that a far more thorough economic 
analysis is necessary to justify imposing a best interest 
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“[I]f [a financial regulator] finds something—a business 
practice of one sort or other—that he does not understand, 
he looks for a [conflict of interest] explanation. And as in this 
field [they] are very ignorant, the number of [misunderstood] 
practices tends to be very large, and the reliance on a 
[conflict of interest] explanation, frequent.”1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This essay examines the costs of transacting investment 
advice and the implications for U.S. financial market 
 
1 See R.H. Coase, Industrial Organization: A Proposal for Research, in 
3 POLICY ISSUES AND RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES IN INDUSTRIAL 
ORGANIZATION 59, 67 (Victor R. Fuchs ed., 1972) (“[I]f an economist finds 
something—a business practice of one sort or another—that he does not 
understand, he looks for a monopoly explanation. And as in this field we 
are very ignorant, the number of [misunderstood] practices tends to be 
very large, and the reliance on a monopoly explanation, frequent.”). 
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regulation. American retail investors get professional 
investment advice from one of two primary sources subject to 
federal regulation: investment advisers and securities 
brokers. Advisers are fiduciaries compensated specifically for 
giving advice, often in the form of a periodic share of the 
value of client accounts.2 Securities brokers, by contrast, give 
investment advice only incidental to executing trades on 
their clients’ behalf, for which they receive brokerage 
commissions or other fees on account transactions.3 Given 
the evanescent quality of investment advice, there can be no 
doubt that transacting investment advice raises myriad 
conflicts of interest or that opportunities abound for the 
parties to take advantage of one another absent basic legal 
protections. 
Securities brokers have long been subject to the 
suitability rule when providing incidental advice.4 The 
suitability rule requires brokers to be reasonably informed of 
their clients’ financial circumstances and to have a 
reasonable basis to believe their recommendations are 
 
2 Section 2(a)(11) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 defines an 
investment adviser as 
any person who, for compensation, engages in the business 
of advising others, either directly or through publications 
or writings, as to the value of securities or as to the 
advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling 
securities, or who, for compensation and as part of a 
regular business, issues or promulgates analyses or reports 
concerning securities. 
Investment Advisers Act § 2(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2 (2012). 
3 Section 2(a)(11) excepts from the definition of investment adviser 
“any broker or dealer whose performance of such services is solely 
incidental to the conduct of his business as a broker or dealer and who 
receives no special compensation therefor.” Id. 
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appropriate under the circumstances, with potential civil 
liability for failure to do so.5 
The suitability rule has recently come under multiple 
attacks from federal regulators charged with protecting 
American investors. In 2011, the SEC published a study 
recommending that brokers be held to the same fiduciary 
standard as advisers,6 but it took no immediate action. Until 
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated it in March 2018,7 
the U.S. Department of Labor (“DOL”)’s Fiduciary Rule 
sought to extend investment advisers’ fiduciary duty to 
securities brokers when they provide incidental investment 
advice for their clients’ retirement accounts.8 The U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) now proposes 
Regulation Best Interest (RBI), which, if implemented, 
would hold brokers to a strict “best interest” standard—
seemingly identical to a fiduciary duty—when providing 
incidental investment advice covering any client account.9 
The best interest standard is aimed at preventing retail 
brokers from recommending securities to inflate their own 
compensation at their clients’ expense. Proposed RBI states 
that a broker must “act in the best interest of the retail 
customer at the time the recommendation is made without 
placing [its] financial or other interest . . . ahead of the 
interest of the retail customer.’”10 Among other things, the 
broker must exercise reasonable care, fully disclose all 
material conflicts of interest, and establish written policies 
 
5 See, e.g., F. Harris Nichols, The Broker’s Duty to His Customer 
Under Evolving Federal Fiduciary and Suitability Standards, 26 BUFF. L. 
REV. 435 (1977). 
6 SEC, STUDY ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKER-DEALERS: AS 
REQUIRED BY SECTION 913 OF THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND 
CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT (2011) [hereinafter 2011 STUDY]. 
7 Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Dep’t of Labor, 885 F.3d 360 
(5th Cir. 2018). 
8 Dep’t of Labor Fiduciary Rule, 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-21(a)(1) (2017) 
[hereinafter Fiduciary Rule]. 
9 Regulation Best Interest, 83 Fed. Reg. 21,574 (proposed May 9, 
2018) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240). The public comment period for 
RBI closed on August 7, 2018. Id. 
10 Id. at 21,598. 
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and procedures reasonably designed to identify and disclose 
or entirely eliminate these conflicts.11 As with the suitability 
rule, a breach could subject them to civil liability to 
aggrieved parties12 and to Financial Industry Regulatory 
Authority (“FINRA”) and SEC enforcement actions carrying 
significant sanctions.13  
Whether RBI is economically justified is the central 
question of this essay. As originally written, the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Act authorized the SEC to regulate 
financial markets as “necessary or appropriate in the public 
interest or for the protection of investors.”14 In addition, it 
must now also consider whether a proposed rule will promote 
“efficiency, competition, and capital formation.”15 Federal 
circuit court case law16 and the SEC’s own internal 
pronouncements have interpreted this language to require 
the SEC to perform an economic analysis of proposed rules 
and to quantify costs and benefits to the extent feasible.17 
 
11 Id. at 21,598–625. 
12 See Fox v. LifeMark Sec. Corp., 84 F. Supp. 3d 239, 244 (W.D.N.Y. 
2015); Kathy Connelly, Note, The Suitability Rule: Should a Private Right 
of Action Exist?, 55 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 493, 504–06 (1981). 
13 See Regulation Best Interest, 83 Fed. Reg. at 21,577 n.16. See also 
Press Release, FINRA, FINRA Sanctions Fifth Third Securities, Inc., $6 
Million for Cost and Fee Disclosure Failures and Unsuitable 
Recommendations Related to Variable Annuity Exchanges (May 8, 2018), 
http://www.finra.org/newsroom/2018/finra-sanctions-fifth-third-securities-
6-million-va-exchange-violations [https://perma.cc/S4CN-QYJF]; Press 
Release, SEC, Morgan Stanley Settles Charges Related to ETF 
Investments (Feb. 14, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2017-
46.html [https://perma.cc/6TZB-8A2R]. 
14 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(27) (2012). 
15 15 U.S.C. § 77b(b) (2012); 15 U.S.C. § 78c(f) (2012). 
16 See Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1148–49 (D.C. Cir. 
2011); Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co. v. SEC, 613 F.3d 166, 178 (D.C. Cir. 
2010); Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133, 136 (D.C. 
Cir. 2005). 
17 See Memorandum from SEC Div. of Risk, Strategy, & Fin. 
Innovation and SEC Office of the Gen. Counsel to Staff of the Rulewriting 
Divisions and Offices, Current Guidance on Economic Analysis in SEC 
Rulemakings 10 (2012) [hereinafter Current Guidance], 
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Quantified cost-benefit analysis (“CBA”) is notoriously 
difficult to do,18 but both executive branch and independent 
agencies are required to perform some plausible assessment 
of costs and benefits when proposing new rules. In Michigan 
v. Environmental Protection Agency,19 the U.S. Supreme 
Court recently found that the Environmental Protection 
Agency (“EPA”) must consider both costs and benefits in 
regulating under the Clean Air Act’s “appropriate and 
necessary” standard,20 and that failure to do so rendered the 
rule arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative 
Procedure Act (“APA”). As the Court put it, 
[T]he phrase ‘appropriate and necessary’ requires at 
least some attention to cost. One would not say that 
it is even rational, never mind ‘appropriate,’ to 
impose billions of dollars in economic costs in return 
for a few dollars in health or environmental benefits 
. . . . No regulation is ‘appropriate’ if it does 
significantly more harm than good.21 
Other federal statutes contain the same enabling language.22 
Going at least as far back as the writings of A.C. Pigou 
almost a century ago,23 mainstream economists and policy 
commentators have widely asserted that government 
regulation is justified when markets fail to efficiently 




18 Wendy L. Gramm, Regulatory Review Issues, October 1985–
February 1988, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 27, 33 (2011); Cass R. Sunstein, 
Financial Regulation and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 124 YALE L.J.F. 263, 264–
65 (2015); see also John C. Coates IV, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial 
Regulation: Case Studies and Implications, 124 YALE L.J. 882 (2015); 
Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Empty Call for Benefit-Cost Analysis in Financial 
Regulation, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. S351 (2014); Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl, 
Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulations: A Response to Criticisms, 
124 YALE L.J.F. 246 (2015). 
19 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015). 
20 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A) (2012).  
21 Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2707. 
22 See supra notes 14–17 and accompanying text. 
23 See A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (1920). 
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situations in which one party takes an action that imposes 
costs or bestows benefits on another party—but fails to 
account for them in choosing the activity level.24 As a result, 
self-interest will lead to too much or too little of the activity, 
leading to socially inefficient resource allocation. Following 
Pigou, the general belief is that a regulation correcting a 
market failure will improve resource allocation and generate 
benefits in excess of its costs, hence the use of CBA as a 
metric for social welfare. 
In his path-breaking work The Problem of Social Cost,25 
Nobel laureate Ronald Coase turned this belief on its head. 
He showed that any threat of inefficient resource allocation 
creates an opportunity for market participants to gain by 
internalizing the externality through private transactions. If 
transaction costs were zero, the parties would naturally 
negotiate for the socially optimal activity level in their own 
self-interest because doing so would increase their joint 
gains from trade. The regulatory rule—e.g., suitability 
versus best interest—would have no effect on resource 
allocation or the parties’ joint welfare, and therefore 
government regulation would be unnecessary.26  
Transaction costs are never zero, and, in any event, they 
increase with the number, size, and complexity of 
transactions, eventually overwhelming the benefits from 
negotiating further adjustments. Some inefficiency will 
persist in the form of resource misallocation, which by 
definition is a state of affairs in which, at the margin, 
benefits fall short of costs or vice-versa. Potential gains from 
trade are lost, but only because the transaction costs the 
 
24 The activity level might be the amount of trading a broker does for 
a client’s account over which the broker has trading discretion, or the 
amount of research a broker does as a basis for recommending trades to a 
client who directs his or her own account. 
25 See generally R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & 
ECON. 1, 43–44 (1960). This is arguably the most influential article ever 
published in economics based on citation count. See William M. Landes & 
Sonia Lahr-Pastor, Measuring Coase’s Influence, 54 J.L. & ECON. 383, 383 
(2011). 
26 Although the parties’ joint wealth would be at a maximum, the 
distribution of wealth between them is indeterminate. 
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parties must incur to capture them outweigh the benefits. 
For a given regulatory framework, the parties will negotiate 
what they privately perceive as efficient resource allocation 
with due consideration for the costs of transacting. The 
outcome is an equilibrium in the sense that neither party 
has any incentive to negotiate further adjustments given the 
transaction costs they face. 
The main Coasean point, often misunderstood, is that the 
costs of transacting can be operationalized to explain why 
the rule of liability indeed affects resource allocation and 
why one rule of liability might therefore be better than 
another. Rather than asking whether the overall benefits of 
a proposed rule will exceed the overall costs, in a Coasean 
framework the proper question is simply whether, at the 
margin, the proposed regulation is likely to reduce the 
parties’ costs of transacting. If so, they can be counted on to 
make all efficient adjustments to the new rule based on their 
knowledge of the particular circumstances of time and place. 
This knowledge is fleeting, circumstantial, and inherently 
unavailable to outside observers because it requires them to 
identify a counterfactual. This is one reason why quantified 
CBA of proposed regulation is so difficult.27 
To the extent that regulators can identify the relevant 
transaction costs and reduce them through regulatory rules, 
market participants will move toward optimal resource 
allocation through private ordering. This is not to say that 
private markets solve all problems or that government 
regulation is incapable of improving resource allocation. 
Where economic analysis is required and the parties deal 
directly, it simply means that regulation is justified only if, 
 
27 See JAMES M. BUCHANAN, COST AND CHOICE: AN INQUIRY IN 
ECONOMIC THEORY (1969); F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 
AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1945). Cass Sunstein, former Administrator of the 
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, acknowledges that financial 
regulators are plagued by the Hayekian knowledge problem, which is that 
the information necessary to formulate rational regulations is dispersed 
across many members of society. In some cases, “Knightian uncertainty” 
will make it impossible for them to perform reliable CBA. Sunstein, supra 
note 18, at 264–65. 
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and to the extent that, it reduces the parties’ transaction 
costs. It is insufficient to identify problems that need 
correcting (including conflicts of interest) without credibly 
making this showing. Only then can the “problem” be 
properly characterized as a market failure requiring a 
corrective rule.  
As Coase stated in his Nobel address, “What I think will 
be considered in the future to have been the important 
contribution of this article is the explicit introduction of 
transaction costs into economic analysis.”28 Three 
generations of scholars have developed Coase’s insights into 
the field now known as transaction cost economics (“TCE”).29 
Transaction costs can and have been used to predict the 
likely competitive effects of a change in the rule of liability 
on evolved patterns of economic organization, such as those 
found in the financial services industry.30 Indeed, TCE has 
 
28 Douglas W. Allen, Transaction Costs, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW 
AND ECONOMICS: THE HISTORY AND METHODOLOGY OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 
896 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000). 
29 Nobel laureate Oliver Williamson probably coined the term 
“transaction cost economics” and was a leading member of a group of 
economists that revolutionized antitrust scholarship, and ultimately the 
law itself, by carefully applying transaction cost economics to various 
business practices, most successfully to vertical business arrangements. 
See, e.g., Robert Dahlstrom & Arne Nygaard, The 2009 Nobel Prize in 
Economics to Oliver E. Williamson: Recognition of the Influence of 
Transaction Cost Economics on Business Research, 86 J. RETAILING 209 
(2010). 
30 For work on financial markets, see, e.g., Stephen A. Berkowitz, 
Dennis E. Logue & Eugene A. Noser, Jr., The Total Cost of Transactions 
on the NYSE, 43 J. FIN. 97 (1988); Harold Demsetz, The Cost of 
Transacting, 82 Q.J. ECON. 33 (1968); Kenneth D. Garbade & William L. 
Silber, Best Execution in Securities Markets: An Application of Signaling 
and Agency Theory, 37 J. FIN. 493 (1982); D. Bruce Johnsen, Property 
Rights to Investment Research: The Agency Costs of Soft Dollar Brokerage, 
11 YALE J. ON REG. 75 (1994); D. Bruce Johnsen, The Quasi-Rent Structure 
of Corporate Enterprise: A Transaction Cost Theory, 44 EMORY L.J. 1277 
(1995). For more general foundational work, see, for example, Armen A. 
Alchian, Why Money?, 9 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 133 (1977); Yoram 
Barzel, Some Fallacies in the Interpretation of Information Costs, 20 J.L. & 
ECON. 291 (1977); Steven N.S. Cheung, Transaction Costs, Risk Aversion, 
and the Choice of Contractual Arrangements, 12 J.L. & ECON. 23 (1969); R. 
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revolutionized antitrust law.31 Where federal courts once 
routinely condemned vertical arrangements such as 
exclusive retailer territories, exclusive product dealing, 
resale price maintenance, price discrimination, customer 
loyalty programs, and others, they now often embrace them 
as efficient methods of reducing conflicts of interest between 
product or service providers and their independent retailers 
to the benefit of consumers.32 The attendant body of 
theoretical and empirical scholarship and antitrust case law 
provides a rich archive to help the SEC better address 
conflicts of interest in the provision of investment advice and 
throughout the financial services industry. 
This essay assesses RBI by identifying the nature of the 
transaction costs retail securities brokers and their clients 
 
H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937); Michael C. 
Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976); 
Benjamin Klein & Keith B. Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring 
Contractual Performance, 89 J. POL. ECON. 615 (1981); F.H. Knight, Some 
Fallacies in the Interpretation of Social Cost, 38 Q.J. ECON. 582 (1924). For 
more recent work, see, for example, Douglas W. Allen & Dean Lueck, 
Transaction Costs and the Design of Cropshare Contracts, 24 RAND J. 
ECON. 78 (1993); D. Bruce Johnsen, The Formation and Protection of 
Property Rights Among the Southern Kwakiutl Indians, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 
41 (1986); Gary D. Libecap & Dean Lueck, The Demarcation of Land and 
the Role of Coordinating Property Institutions, 119 J. POL. ECON. 426 
(2011); Scott E. Masten & Keith J. Crocker, Efficient Adaptation in Long-
Term Contracts: Take-or-Pay Provisions for Natural Gas, 75 AM. ECON. 
REV. 1083 (1985); Scott E. Masten, James W. Meehan, Jr. & Edward A. 
Snyder, The Costs of Organization, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1 (1991); Scott E. 
Masten, James W. Meehan, Jr. & Edward A. Snyder, Vertical Integration 
in the U.S. Auto Industry: A Note on the Influence of Transaction Specific 
Assets, 12 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 265 (1989). 
31 For early influential work in antitrust, see Lee Benham, The Effect 
of Advertising on the Price of Eyeglasses, 15 J.L. & ECON. 337 (1972); 
Benjamin Klein, Robert G. Crawford & Armen A. Alchian, Vertical 
Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 
21 J.L. & ECON. 297 (1978); Klein & Leffler, supra note 30; Howard P. 
Marvel, Exclusive Dealing, 25 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1982); Lester G. Telser, Why 
Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J.L. & ECON. 86 (1960). 
32 See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 
U.S. 877 (2007). 
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face in transacting investment advice. It has six parts. Part 
II provides a brief history of CBA in federal regulation. It 
explains the SEC’s statutory mandate to perform CBA of 
proposed rules and then reviews three landmark decisions 
from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit (“D.C. Circuit”) rejecting the SEC’s CBA as “arbitrary 
and capricious” under the APA.33 Part III describes the 
assault by the SEC and the DOL on the traditional 
suitability rule for retail brokers, culminating in RBI. Part 
IV provides a basic economic overview of the neoclassical 
model of exchange, the foundation for traditional CBA. It 
reviews the standard economic rationale for government 
regulation based on so-called externalities that are said to 
cause the market to fail and takes a more careful look at 
market failure by accounting for the costs of transacting. 
Where traditional CBA is inconclusive and the parties’ costs 
of transacting are modest, the regulator should assess the 
proposed rule’s likely effect on the parties’ costs of 
transacting. The rule is justified only if transaction costs are 
likely to fall.34 Part V examines the RBI proposing release 
and explains the SEC’s economic rationale for the best 
interest standard. A preliminary transaction cost assessment 
shows that its CBA provides insufficient analytical or 
empirical justification for the best interest standard. Far 
more work building and testing a transaction cost model of 
the market for retail brokerage is necessary before a 
compelling case can be made that a change in the rule of 
liability will improve investor welfare in a way that properly 
considers efficiency, competition, and capital formation. This 
conclusion is all the more forceful owing to the uncertainty 
such a dramatic change would entail. Part VI provides a 
summary and concluding remarks. 
 
33 Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1148–49 (D.C. Cir. 2011); 
Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co. v. SEC, 613 F.3d 166, 178 (D.C. Cir. 2010); 
Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133, 136 (D.C. Cir. 
2005). 
34 To be more precise, a rule is justified if it reduces the discounted 
present value of transaction costs by more than the up-front costs of 
implementing it. 
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II. OVERVIEW OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF 
FINANCIAL REGULATION 
A. Brief History of Cost-Benefit Analysis 
In 1980, President Carter signed the Paperwork 
Reduction Act into law.35 This statute created the Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs (“OIRA”) to “review and 
approve agency collections of information, including those 
related to regulations.”36 Shortly thereafter, President 
Reagan put teeth into regulatory oversight with his 
Executive Order 12,291 mandating that executive agencies 
perform CBA of proposed rules.37 In relevant part, section 2 
of the Executive Order states: 
(a) Administrative decisions shall be based on 
adequate information concerning the need for and 
consequences of proposed government action; 
(b) Regulatory action shall not be undertaken unless 
the potential benefits to society for the regulation 
outweigh the potential costs to society;  
. . . . 
(e) Agencies shall set regulatory priorities with the 
aim of maximizing the aggregate net benefits to 
society, taking into account the condition of the 
particular industries affected by regulations, the 
 
35 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501–21 (2012). 
36 Susan E. Dudley, Observations on OIRA’s Thirtieth Anniversary, 63 
ADMIN. L. REV. 113, 114 (2011); see also Gramm, supra note 18, at 28; Jim 
Tozzi, OIRA’s Formative Years: The Historical Record of Centralized 
Regulatory Review Preceding OIRA’s Founding, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 37, 55 
(2011). 
37 Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (Feb. 17, 1981). 
Subsection (1)(d) reads as follows: “‘Agency’ means any authority of the 
United States that is an ‘agency’ under 44 U.S.C. 3502(1), excluding those 
agencies specified in 44 U.S.C. 3502(10).” Note that amendments have 
since moved the definition of “agency” to 44 U.S.C. § 3502(5). This 
definition refers to “independent agencies” and specifically lists the SEC 
among them. 44 U.S.C. § 3502(5). 
2018.3_JOHNSEN_FINAL  
No. 3:695] A TRANSACTION COST ASSESSMENT 707 
condition of the national economy, and other 
regulatory actions contemplated for the future.38 
The Executive Order makes the Office of Management 
and Budget (OMB) responsible for assessing regulations to 
ensure they plausibly maximize aggregate net benefits to 
society. It requires regulatory impact analysis (RIA) of 
“major rules”39 and requires the Director of OMB to 
“[m]onitor agency compliance with the requirements of this 
Order and advise the President with respect to such 
compliance.”40  
In 1993, President Clinton’s Executive Order 12,866 
replaced Executive Order 12,291.41 It maintains the 
substantive cost-benefit provisions but adds others and 
recognizes OIRA as the authority for oversight and review of 
agency CBA.42 Notably, it frames the call for regulation in 
the language of market failure. The preamble and section 1 
to Executive Order 12,866 provides the following seemingly 
sensible foundation for justifying federal regulation:  
[T]he private sector and private markets are the best 
engine for economic growth . . . . Federal agencies 
should promulgate only such regulations as . . . are 
made necessary by compelling public need, such as 
material failures of private markets to protect . . . the 
well-being of the American people.43  
Section 1(b)(7) of the Order also advises federal agencies to 
“base [their] decisions on the best reasonably obtainable 
scientific, technical, economic, and other information 
concerning the need for, and consequences of, the intended 
regulation.”44  
 
38 Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. at 13,193–94 (emphasis 
added). 
39 Id. at 13,194. 
40 Id. at 13,196. 
41 Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993). 
42 Id. § 6(b). 
43 Id. at 51,735 (emphasis added). 
44 Id. at 51,736. 
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Executive Order 12,866 remains in effect today, but in 
January 2011 President Obama reinforced it with Executive 
Order 13,563, requiring, among other things, executive 
agencies to allow internet submission of public comments, to 
provide for greater coordination with other agencies, to 
ensure scientific integrity, and to further provide for 
retrospective analysis of existing rules.45 Although 
independent agencies such as the SEC are exempt from 
these orders, Executive Order 13,579 provides that they 
should comply with its provisions to the extent permitted by 
law.46 At the very least, the executive orders outline best 
practices for all federal agency rulemaking. 
B. Cost-Benefit Analysis at the SEC 
1. Statutory and Case Law 
In 1996, Congress passed the National Securities Market 
Improvement Act (“NSMIA”) adding the following language 
to the Securities Act of 1933, Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 (“SEA”), and the Investment Company Act of 1940 
(“ICA”): 
(b) Consideration of Promotion of Efficiency, 
Competition, and Capital Formation.—Whenever 
pursuant to this title the Commission is engaged in 
rulemaking and is required to consider or determine 
whether an action is necessary or appropriate in the 
public interest, the Commission shall also consider, 
in addition to the protection of investors, whether the 
action will promote efficiency, competition, and 
capital formation.47 
Beginning in 2005, three cases from the D.C. Circuit found 
that the efficiency-competition-capital formation language 
 
45 Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 21, 2011). 
46 Exec. Order No. 13,579, 76 Fed. Reg. 41,587 (July 14, 2011). 
47 Pub. L. No. 104-290, § 106(b), 110 Stat. 3416, 3424 (1996) (codified 
as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77b(b) (2012), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(f) (2012), and 15 
U.S.C. § 80a–2(c) (2012)). 
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requires the SEC to perform CBA of all proposed rules, and 
in each case it found the SEC’s CBA deficient. 
In Chamber of Commerce v. SEC,48 the Chamber sought 
review of the SEC’s Investment Company Governance Rule 
(“Governance Rule”).49 Over the dissent of two 
commissioners, the Governance Rule would have conditioned 
various exemptions most mutual funds enjoy from provisions 
of the ICA on having boards with at least seventy-five 
percent outside directors and an independent chairman.50  
The SEC considered the rule “necessary and appropriate 
in the public interest and . . . consistent with the protection 
of investors”51 owing to recent scandals involving late trading 
of mutual fund shares, inappropriate market timing of fund 
shares, and misuse of nonpublic information about fund 
portfolios.52 It viewed these actions as serious breakdowns in 
internal advisory firm controls and evidence that the funds 
were being used for the benefit of the advisory firm or its 
employees, possibly including inside directors of the affected 
funds, rather than for the benefit of fund shareholders.53 In 
the SEC’s view, the proposed fund governance standards 
would put fund boards in a better position to demand that 
their managers adhere to the highest of compliance 
 
48 Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133 (D.C. Cir. 
2005). The SEA, the ICA, and Investment Advisers Act (“IAA”) all allow 
persons aggrieved by a final order of the Commission to obtain review of 
the order in the United States Court of Appeals for the circuit in which he 
or she resides or has his or her principal place of business or in the District 
of Columbia Circuit. See 15 U.S.C. § 78y(a)(1) (2012); 15 U.S.C. § 80a-42(a) 
(2012); 15 U.S.C. § 80b-13(a) (2012). 
49 Investment Company Governance, 69 Fed. Reg. 46,378 (Aug. 2, 
2004) [hereinafter Governance Rule]. 
50 Id. at 46,381. The ICA mandates that mutual funds have no more 
than sixty percent “interested” directors. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(a). By ICA 
Rule 12(b)-1, the SEC had already conditioned various exemptions on a 
mutual fund having a majority of outside directors. See 66 Fed. Reg. 3733 
(Jan. 16, 2001) (to be codified at 17 CFR pts. 239, 240, 270, 274). 
51 Governance Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. at 46,379 n.11. 
52 Id. at 46,378. 
53 Id. at 46,379. 
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standards and to better oversee activities involving conflicts 
of interest.54 
The Chamber challenged the Governance Rule on two 
grounds. Among other things, it argued that the SEC lacked 
substantive authority under the ICA to adopt the two 
conditions and that the SEC’s rulemaking process violated 
the APA.55 The court found that the SEC does have the 
substantive authority to condition access to various 
exemptions on compliance with the Governance Rule.56 It 
took issue with the SEC on an important point, however. The 
court found that the SEC had failed to adequately consider 
the costs of the conditions it proposed and hence their likely 
effect on efficiency, competition, and capital formation.57 
Although an empirical study is unnecessary, a regulator 
must nevertheless do its best to assess costs. The SEC 
claimed the factual record on which it had based its ruling 
lacked a “reliable basis for determining how funds would 
choose to satisfy the condition and therefore it was difficult 
to determine the costs associated with electing independent 
directors.”58 The court was unmoved: 
That particular difficulty may mean the Commission 
can determine only the range within which a fund’s 
cost of compliance will fall, depending upon how it 
responds to the condition but, as the Chamber 
contends, it does not excuse the Commission from its 
statutory obligation to determine as best it can the 
economic implications of the rule it has proposed  
. . . .  
[U]ncertainty may limit what the Commission can 
do, but does not excuse the Commission from its 
statutory obligation to do what it can to apprise 
itself—and hence the public and the Congress—of the 
 
54 Id. 
55 5 U.S.C. § 500 (2012). 
56 Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133, 136 (D.C. 
Cir. 2005). 
57 Id. 
58 Id. at 143 (internal quotations omitted) (citations omitted). 
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economic consequences of a proposed regulation 
before it decides whether to adopt the measure.59  
Accordingly, the court held that the SEC had violated its 
obligation under the ICA, and therefore the APA, by failing 
to adequately consider the costs the two challenged 
conditions imposed on mutual funds.60 
The petitioner in American Equity v. SEC, American 
Equity Investment Life Insurance Company, sought the D.C. 
Circuit’s review of the SEC’s proposed Rule 151A under the 
SEA.61 According to the Rule, fixed index annuity contracts 
would not qualify for the Act’s registration exemption for 
“annuity contracts” because they include certain elements of 
risk characteristic of a security, rather than those of a mere 
insurance contract.62 Absent this exemption, as an issuer of 
securities American Equity was therefore subject to the Act’s 
registration and reporting requirements. 
The court rejected American Equity’s claim that the SEC 
had exceeded its authority in excluding fixed index annuities 
from the annuity contract exemption but agreed with its 
claim that the SEC had failed to properly consider the Rule’s 
effect on efficiency, competition, and capital formation.63 The 
thrust of the SEC’s rationale for the Rule was that the 
absence of a clear rule identifying the regulatory status of 
fixed index annuities injected sufficient uncertainty into the 
market that efficiency, competition, and capital formation 
 
59 Id. at 143–44. 
60 Id. at 144. The aftermath of Chamber of Commerce is worth 
recounting. When the Court sent the matter back to the SEC, the SEC had 
only eight days to reconsider the effect of the rule on costs before 
Chairman Donaldson’s term would expire. Having no time to add to the 
record, it relied on the existing record to reaffirm the rule. The Chamber of 
Commerce again sought review. Since the SEC had already admitted that 
the existing record was inadequate to assess costs, the D.C. Circuit once 
again found it had violated the APA and sent the case back for further 
consideration based on an enhanced record. See Chamber of Commerce of 
the U.S. v. SEC, 443 F. 3d 890 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
61 Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co. v. SEC, 613 F.3d 166 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
62 Id. at 173. 
63 Id. at 167, 177. 
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were undermined.64 In the court’s opinion, however, it was 
not enough for the SEC simply to declare that some rule is 
necessary.65 It must first establish a pre-rule baseline for 
assessing efficiency, competition, and capital formation in 
the market for fixed index annuities and then identify the 
relative merits of the proposed rule in comparison to the 
alternative.66 It had not done so. The court explained: 
Section 2(b) does not ask for an analysis of whether 
any rule would have an effect on competition. Rather, 
it asks for an analysis of whether the specific rule 
will promote efficiency, competition, and capital 
formation. The SEC’s reasoning with respect to 
competition supports at most the conclusion that any 
SEC action in this area could promote competition, 
but does not establish Rule 151A’s effect on 
competition.67 
Accordingly, the court determined the SEC lacked a 
reasoned basis for imposing the specific rule it had chosen 
and was therefore arbitrary and capricious in violation of the 
APA.68 
Most recently, in Business Roundtable v. SEC,69 the D.C. 
Circuit vacated SEA Rule 14a-11, known as the Proxy Access 
Rule.70 With modest limitations, the Proxy Access Rule 
would have required any company subject to the SEA, 
including investment companies, to add to their proxy 
materials the name of anyone nominated for a directors seat 
by a shareholder who had held at least three percent of the 
firm’s voting stock for at least three years.71 The effect of the 
rule would have been to allow qualified dissident 
 
64 Id. at 177. 
65 Id. at 178. 
66 Id. at 178–80. 
67 Id. at 178 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
68 Id. at 177. 
69 Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
70 Proxy Access Rule: Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 
75 Fed. Reg. 56,668 (Sept. 16, 2010). 
71 Id. at 56,674–75. 
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shareholders partial control over the ballot to elect the 
company’s board of directors. 
The SEC reasoned that the rule could create “potential 
benefits of improved board and company performance and 
shareholder value [that] justify [its] potential costs.”72 Over 
the dissent of two commissioners, it had rejected proposals to 
allow each company to choose whether to adopt and disclose 
the same requirements, arguing that “exclusive reliance on 
private ordering under State law would not be as effective 
and efficient” in helping shareholders exercise their control 
rights.73 It had also rejected a proposal to exclude 
investment companies from the rule, which were already 
subject to statutory safeguards under the ICA.74 Even 
though the SEC acknowledged the Rule might have adverse 
effects on corporations and their boards in terms of 
distraction from long-term strategic planning, it reasoned 
that established state law proxy rules, and not the Rule’s 
enhanced proxy access, are the underlying cause of any 
adverse effects on corporate boards.75 
The Court disagreed and found the rule arbitrary and 
capricious in violation of the APA. Among other things, it 
faulted the SEC for declaring the costs of board distraction 
from enhanced proxy access to be merely an incident of 
traditional state law proxy contest rules.76 Citing to 
Chamber of Commerce, the Court reiterated: “As we have 
said before, this type of reasoning, which fails to view a cost 
at the margin, is illogical and, in an economic analysis, 
unacceptable.”77  
2. The SEC’s Current Guidance Memo 
With three consecutive losses in the D.C. Circuit, the SEC 
must have resolved to take economic analysis in the 
 
72 Id. at 56,761. 
73 Id. at 56,759–60. 
74 Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1154. 
75 Id. at 1155–56. 
76 Id. at 1154 (emphasis added). 
77 Id. at 1151, 1154 (emphasis added). 
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rulemaking process more seriously. In March 2012, it 
published an internal memo titled, “Current Guidance on 
Economic Analysis in SEC Rulemakings” (“Current 
Guidance”),78 which the then-Division of Risk, Strategy, and 
Financial Innovation (“RSFI”) and the Office of the General 
Counsel jointly authored. The memo is conceptually clear 
and appears to reflect an honest commitment to integrating 
economic analysis into the rulemaking process. As one 
commentator put it, “The 2012 Guidance has in effect 
amended the micro-constitution of the SEC staff, elevating 
the economists to the status of a co-equal branch of the 
agency.”79 Rather than economic analysis of proposed rules 
being relegated to the “back-end”80 of the rulemaking 
process, it is now included in the earliest stages, from pre-
proposal to adoption.81 Another commentator reports that 
between 2011 and 2014, the budget and staff of Ph.D. 
economists in RSFI (by then renamed the Division of 
Economics and Risk Analysis) more than doubled.82  
The Current Guidance memo asserts that the SEC has no 
explicit statutory or executive duty to conduct CBA when it 
adopts a rule. As a matter of good regulatory practice,83 
however, it accepts the Chamber of Commerce court’s 
admonition that it has a “statutory obligation to determine 
 
78 Current Guidance, supra note 17. 
79 Bruce R. Kraus, Economists in the Room at the SEC, 124 YALE 
L.J.F. 280, 302 (2015). 
80 See Jerry Ellig & Hester Peirce, SEC Regulatory Analysis: “A Long 
Way to Go and a Short Time to Get There”, 8 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. 
L. 361, 365–66 (2014). 
81 Kraus, supra note 79, at 300. 
82 See Joshua T. White, The Evolving Role of Economic Analysis in 
SEC Rulemaking, 50 GA. L. REV. 293, 308–09 (2015). 
83 See also the 2011 statement of SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt, 
recognizing that there is “an expectation that the SEC would perform cost-
benefit analyses as part of the rulemaking process.” OFFICE OF AUDITS, 
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., SEC, REPORT NO. 499, FOLLOW-UP REVIEW OF 
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as best it can the economic implications” of a proposed rule.84 
It correctly recognizes the difficulty of doing reliable CBA of 
financial regulation—especially to the point of quantifying 
costs and benefits.85 Nevertheless, it instructs SEC 
economists to “quantify anticipated costs and benefits” to the 
extent feasible, “even where the available data is 
imperfect.”86 
Among the benefits a rule might provide, the memo lists 
reduced incentive misalignment, reduced monitoring costs, 
lower cost of capital, better information sharing resulting in 
lower risk premiums and better allocation of capital, 
enhanced competition leading to reduced prices or higher 
quality, the avoidance of collective action problems, the 
avoidance of moral hazard, reduced transaction costs, and 
more efficient enforcement of SEC rules.87 
Drawing on principles set out in Executive Order 12,866, 
the memo relies largely on the notion of market failure as 
the justification for regulation.88 It identifies collective action 
problems as a primary reason market participants cannot 
resolve market failures through private ordering, and it lists 
the following as examples of market failure: “market power, 
externalities, principal-agent problems (such as economic 
conflicts of interest), and asymmetric information.”89 As 
discussed below, there is good reason to be skeptical that 
every perceived market failure justifies regulation, including 
those market failures specifically listed. The critical question 
in determining if a given regulation is justified by a market 
failure is whether the regulation ameliorates the market 
failure by lowering the parties’ costs of transacting. 
 
84 Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133, 143 (D.C. 
Cir. 2005). 
85 Current Guidance, supra note 17, at 10 (citing U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-151, DODD-FRANK ACT REGULATIONS: 
IMPLEMENTATION COULD BENEFIT FROM ADDITIONAL ANALYSES AND 
COORDINATION 19 (2011)). 
86 Id. at 13. 
87 Id. at 10–11. 
88 Id. at 4–5. 
89 Id. at 5. 
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III. THE ASSAULT ON SUITABILITY 
A. Fiduciary Status for Retail Brokers? 
1. The SEC’s 2011 Study and DOL’s Response 
In January 2011, the SEC published its Study on 
Investment Advisers and Broker-Dealers (“2011 Study”) 
recommending that securities brokers be held to a fiduciary 
standard.90 The 2011 Study relies heavily on a 2008 RAND 
Foundation report assessing retail investors’ knowledge of 
their investment accounts based on survey evidence.91 The 
report finds that retail investors are generally unaware or 
confused “regarding the roles, titles, and legal obligations of 
investment advisers and broker-dealers, although . . . 
investors generally were satisfied with their financial 
professionals.”92 The 2011 Study also finds that retail 
brokers suffer from material conflicts of interest that often 
go undisclosed to their clients and that brokers sometimes 
take advantage of their clients’ ignorance by recommending 
investments to maximize their own compensation.93  
The 2011 Study offers little in the way of substantive 
analysis of retail investor ignorance or broker performance to 
justify its findings, let alone a penetrating assessment of the 
subtle trade-offs that are invariably at stake in any conflict 
of interest setting. Yet, with no empirical support, it asserts 
that brokerage clients “expect” their brokers to act in their 
best interest when giving advice.94 To correct the problem of 
investor ignorance, and perhaps failed expectations, the 2011 
Study recommends that retail brokers be held to the same 
fiduciary standard as investment advisers: 
 
90 See 2011 STUDY, supra note 6. 
91 See ANGELA A. HUNG, NOREEN CLANCY, JEFF DOMINITZ, ERIC TALLEY, 
CLAUDE BERREBI & FARRUKH SUVANKULOV, RAND INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL 
JUSTICE, INVESTOR AND INDUSTRY PERSPECTIVES ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS 
AND BROKER DEALERS 71 (2008). 
92 2011 STUDY, supra note 6, at v. 
93 See id. at 101. 
94 Id. at i. 
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[T]he standard of conduct for all brokers, dealers, 
and investment advisers, when providing 
personalized investment advice about securities to 
retail customers (and such other customers as the 
Commission may by rule provide), shall be to act in 
the best interest of the customer without regard to 
the financial or other interest of the broker, dealer, 
or investment adviser providing the advice.95 
Although the 2011 Study provides an abstract cost 
assessment, it says little about the likely benefits of a 
fiduciary rule. It nonetheless recommends in favor of a 
uniform fiduciary standard without having performed an 
adequate CBA or any other thorough economic analysis.  
Following collaboration with the SEC, the DOL moved to 
expand its longstanding fiduciary rule for investment 
managers who exercise investment discretion over clients’ 
retirement accounts to cover the incidental investment 
advice that securities brokers provide their retail clients.96 
Soon after the DOL finalized it, the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce challenged the expanded Fiduciary Rule.97 In 
March 2018, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit vacated the Fiduciary Rule completely.98 Securities 
brokers earn commissions and fees solely for buying or 
selling securities and provide their clients with investment 
advice only incidentally. Among other things, the court found 
that the Rule conflicts with the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”)’s clear statutory text, 
 
95 Id. at vi. 
96 Fiduciary Rule, 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-21(a)(1) (2018). 
97 The DOL issued the final rule on April 7, 2016. See Ilyse Schuman, 
Melissa Kurtzman, Steve Friedman & Sean Brown, Department of Labor 
Issues Final Fiduciary Rule, LITTLER (Apr. 7, 2016), 
https://www.littler.com/publication-press/publication/department-labor-
issues-final-fiduciary-rule [http://perma.cc/Q95D-AMQB]. The Chamber 
filed in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas on June 
1, 2016. See Complaint, Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Hugler, 231 
F. Supp. 3d 152 (N.D. Tex. 2017) (No. 3:16–cv–1476–M), rev’d, 885 F.3d 
360 (5th Cir. 2018). 
98 Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 885 F.3d 
360, 363 (5th Cir. 2018). 
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which applies only to persons who render investment advice 
for a fee or other compensation.99 There is no evidence that 
the Trump administration plans to appeal or to amend the 
Fiduciary Rule to conform to the statute. 
B. The SEC’s Regulation Best Interest 
In June 2017, SEC Chairman Jay Clayton called for 
public comments on the 2011 Study.100 Apparently based on 
these comments, the SEC proposed RBI in May 2018. Rather 
than holding retail securities brokers to the same fiduciary 
standard as investment advisers, RBI proposes that they be 
subject only to a best interest obligation. Since the 2011 
Study states that the essence of a fiduciary standard for 
brokers is the obligation to act in their clients’ best 
interest,101 it does not appear that RBI proposes anything 
different than the 2011 Study. 
The RBI proposing release occupies over one hundred 
pages in the Federal Register and addresses a broad range of 
issues.102 It repeats the 2011 Study’s conclusion that 
material conflicts of interest abound in the retail brokerage 
industry, that clients are ignorant of these conflicts and 
incapable of protecting themselves, and that brokers 
sometimes exploit their informational advantage by 
recommending investments that increase their own 
compensation while compromising their clients’ investment 
returns.103 A prominent example, and one the DOL relied on 
heavily to justify its expanded Fiduciary Rule,104 occurs 
 
99 Id. at 372. 
100 Jay Clayton, Chairman, SEC, Public Statement: Public Comments 
from Retail Investors and Other Interested Parties on Standards of 
Conduct for Investment Advisers and Broker-Dealers (June 1, 2017), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/statement-chairman-clayton-
2017-05-31 [https://perma.cc/W8FQ-CMUR]. 
101 See Regulation Best Interest, 83 Fed. Reg. 21,574 (proposed May 9, 
2018) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240). 
102 See id. at 21,579. 
103 See id. at 21,583, 21,618. 
104 The Fiduciary Rule relies specifically on “variation in the share of 
front-end loads that advisers receive when selling different mutual funds 
2018.3_JOHNSEN_FINAL  
No. 3:695] A TRANSACTION COST ASSESSMENT 719 
when a broker recommends that a client invest in mutual 
fund shares whose issuers pay the broker a sales fee—called 
a “load”— rather than one of the increasing number of funds 
that charge no load.105 The RBI’s best interest standard 
would require brokers to disclose all such conflicts of interest 
or, if disclosure is ineffective, to eliminate them entirely by 
refraining from making the recommendation.106 
In a subsection entitled Broad Economic Considerations, 
the proposing release relies on influential work by Jensen 
and Meckling to lay a proper economic foundation for 
understanding principal-agent relations such as those 
between securities brokers and their retail clients.107 An 
agency relationship is one in which the principal delegates 
some decision-making authority to the agent to act on the 
principal’s behalf. The “principal” can consist of multiple 
parties, as with shareholders in a corporation. The parties’ 
interests will invariably diverge and lead to conflicts of 
interest, or agency problems. 
Though costly, the principal will normally monitor the 
agent to ensure he or she avoids shirking or consuming the 
principal’s assets for his or her personal benefit, and the 
agent will attempt to bond himself against such behavior 
through contractual or reputational mechanisms. Together, 
monitoring and bonding constitute agency costs.108 Because 
these costs will exceed any further benefits at some point, 
 
. . . .” Definition of the Term “Fiduciary”; Conflict of Interest Rule–
Retirement Investment Advice, 81 Fed. Reg. 20,946, 20,951 (Apr. 8, 2016). 
105 With a traditional up-front load the client deposits, say, $100 with 
a broker, who remits $95 to the fund company in exchange for shares 
deposited to the client’s account. The broker pockets the five-dollar 
difference to compensate for marketing costs, as clearly set out in the 
fund’s prospectus.   
106 See Regulation Best Interest, 83 Fed. Reg. at 21,603, 21,611. 
107 Id. at 21,629 n.371. 
108 It is tempting to think the principal bears the costs of monitoring 
and the agent bears the costs of bonding. This is not necessarily correct. 
Just as with the incidence of a tax, who bears the burden depends on the 
relative demand and supply elasticities—the ability of the parties to 
reduce the associated costs or to find suitable alternatives. See, e.g., N. 
GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 124 (8th ed. 2018). 
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the parties will stop short of first-best resource allocation 
and leave some potential gains from trade on the table. 
Jensen and Meckling refer to these forgone gains as the 
“residual losses.”109 Residual losses are a cost only relative to 
a first-best world in which monitoring and bonding are 
costless. At the margin, it simply does not pay the parties to 
incur an added dollar monitoring or bonding if doing so 
reduces residual losses by less than a dollar. In this sense, 
the parties are content with second-best resource allocation. 
IV. BASIC ECONOMICS 
This Part reviews the basic economics of regulation, 
including a brief look at the neoclassical model on which 
CBA rests. Its focus is on describing what CBA attempts to 
measure, and it abstracts from thorny issues involving risk, 
the value of life,110 and various moral conundrums. It then 
discusses market failure as the justification for corrective 
regulation and takes a closer look at market failure to 
account for the costs of transacting. 
A. Assessing Welfare in the Basic Neoclassical 
Model111 
The neoclassical model of market exchange provides the 
theoretical foundation for traditional CBA. It illustrates the 
welfare effects of trade embedded in market demand and 
supply assuming, among other things, that individuals and 
firms are rational utility maximizers, that no buyer or seller 
has market power, that all economic actors bear the full 
costs of their decisions and capture the full benefits, that all 
 
109 Jensen & Meckling, supra note 30, at 308. 
110 See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi & Joseph E. Aldy, The Value of a 
Statistical Life: A Critical Review of Market Estimates Throughout the 
World, 27 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 5 (2003). 
111 The reader in need of a more elaborate description of the 
Neoclassical Model can consult any intermediate price theory text. See, 
e.g., ARMEN A. ALCHIAN, WILLIAM R. ALLEN, EXCHANGE & PRODUCTION: 
COMPETITION, COORDINATION & CONTROL (3d ed. 1983); N. GREGORY 
MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS (8th ed. 2018). 
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parties have full information, and that the interacting 
parties face zero transaction costs. In equilibrium, the model 
hypothesizes that market prices will reflect marginal 
benefits and costs, and that the parties will capture all 
potential gains from trade in the form of consumer and 
producer surplus, or social welfare. With costless 
transacting, the allocation of resources is said to be socially 
optimal, or “first best.” 
These assumptions provide a foundation for explaining 
how individuals and firms make decisions and are not an 
attempt to accurately characterize reality. All that matters is 
that the assumptions lead to testable predictions consistent 
with real-world observation. Whether or not people make 
cognitively rational decisions is irrelevant. The important 
question is whether they behave as if they are cognitively 
rational and fully informed.112 Transaction cost economics 
has shown many times that behavior seemingly consistent 
with the neoclassical model can be easily explained by 





112 See Milton Friedman, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in 
ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS 3, 40–41 (1953). In a competitive market, 
firms that happen to zig when they should zag will be eliminated from the 
system. Those remaining will appear to have chosen correctly even if their 
managers lacked the wherewithal to make an intelligent choice. See 
Armen E. Alchian, Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory, 58 J. 
POL. ECON. 211, 220–21 (1950). 
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Figure 1: Social Welfare 
 
 
Figure 1 shows the unit rate of output for a traded good, 
Q, on the horizontal axis and the price in dollars per unit, P, 
on the vertical axis. Line D shows consumer demand for the 
good, which is synonymous with aggregate marginal 
valuation (∑ MVi) across i consumers, or social benefit, for 
each possible rate of output. The demand curve slopes 
downward to the right to reflect diminishing marginal 
valuation. Line S shows aggregate supply of the good across i 
producers, roughly reflecting their aggregate marginal cost 
(∑ MCj) for each possible quantity, with these costs equal to 
the value of productive inputs if deployed elsewhere. The 
supply curve slopes up to the right, reflecting increasing 
marginal cost. 
In a well-functioning competitive market with no 
transaction costs, the equilibrium price is P* and output is 
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Q*. Consumers make total expenditures equal to rectangle 
P* x Q*. For the marginal unit of the good, consumer 
valuation is exactly equal to price, and consumers are 
indifferent to whether they buy this unit or not, so it 
generates no surplus—“net benefits”—at margin. Moving 
backward along the demand curve, consumers’ valuation of 
the good increasingly exceeds the price they pay. For Q* 
units per period, their total valuation is represented by the 
large trapezoid under the demand curve between zero units 
and Q* units. Subtracting their total expenditures, P* x Q*, 
the remaining upper dotted triangle is known as consumer 
surplus, one component of social welfare. 
A similar story can be told for producers. For Q* units, 
they are indifferent to whether or not they supply the 
marginal unit because P* = MC for that unit. As a result of 
supplying Q* units rather than none, they earn total 
revenues of P* x Q*, exactly what consumers spend. Their 
cost of supplying Q* units is the trapezoid beneath MC from 
zero to Q*. The difference is represented by the lower cross-
hatched triangle. 
Together, consumer and producer surplus constitute the 
gains from trade, total social welfare, or what Executive 
Order 12,291 refers to as the “aggregate net benefits to 
society”113 from having Q* units rather than none at all. The 
resulting allocation of resources is said to be pareto optimal 
because no reallocation can improve social welfare. 
Hypothetically, if output is forced below Q*, consumers 
sacrifice more value than producers save. If output is forced 
above Q*, producers lose more value than consumers gain. 
The neoclassical model is remarkably powerful for 
predicting the direction of the marginal effects from an 
outside shock, widely known as “comparative statics.”114 
Obvious examples include the imposition of a new tax or a 
restriction on trade that shifts either the demand or supply 
curve and causes predictable changes in prices, rates of 
 
113 See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 § 2 (Feb. 17, 
1981). 
114 See generally EUGENE SILBERBERG & WING SUEN, THE STRUCTURE 
OF ECONOMICS: A MATHEMATICAL ANALYSIS 1–15 (3d ed. 2001). 
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output, and other observable reflections of the parties’ 
behavior. More generally, the model can be used to explain 
how and why observed patterns of behavior vary across time 
or differ cross-sectionally when the constraints that market 
participants face change at the margin. The model is not 
only testable, but has been repeatedly tested and has 
survived testing largely intact. 
The neoclassical model’s reliability falls off as we move 
beyond comparative statics. Quantifying social welfare, or 
even just the marginal effect on social welfare from a given 
shock, is far less reliable. Economists hypothesize that the 
area under a demand curve up to any arbitrary rate of 
output reflects total consumer valuation, but getting enough 
data to reliably estimate a real-world demand curve is 
problematic. Not only is the economy a noisy place, but most 
of the variation we observe is in a narrow neighborhood 
around the equilibrium price and quantity. Among other 
things, accurate quantification requires the researcher to 
estimate how much people would pay for the first few units 
of a good whose normal consumption might be in the 
millions. The thorny scientific question is what evidence 
could possibly refute any specific measure of social welfare 
or, by implication, any cost-benefit analysis? 
The same can be said on the producer side. The supply 
curve roughly reflects marginal costs aggregated across all 
producers, but (as Executive Order 12,866 recognizes) the 
economic definition of cost is opportunity cost—the value of 
the next best opportunity forgone. Opportunity costs are 
seldom observable in an objective way. They have only a 
loose relationship to out-of-pocket expenses, do not appear on 
balance sheets or income statements, and, in any event, 
reflect the value of actions not taken and therefore 
unobservable. Indeed, economists generally do not assert 
that market participants themselves know the opportunity 
cost of their decisions, only that they behave as if they know. 
Assessing opportunity cost at the margin is also troublesome 
because it represents the increase in total cost owing to a 
one-unit increase in output while holding all else equal, a 
normally unobservable counterfactual. What most laymen 
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have in mind when they think of cost is average cost—total 
cost divided by total output—which is much easier to observe 
and measure, but in many settings it is an inappropriate 
basis for predicting the choices people make or the relevant 
costs for CBA. 
This is not to say quantified CBA is hopeless. Over the 
years, econometricians have made tremendous progress 
developing empirical methods to help see through the noise 
in the data and to disentangle the various factors that 
influence market outcomes. Far more complete data is now 
available.115 With the advent of scanners that record 
millions of retail transactions evidencing huge variations in 
prices and quantities, economists have begun to make 
headway estimating demand and consumer surplus, possibly 
bringing quantified CBA within reach. One early study 
estimates the demand for a new breakfast cereal, putting the 
annual addition to consumer surplus in the range of $66 to 
$78 billon.116 Another estimates the demand for Uber rides, 
with total benefits to U.S. consumers also in the billions of 
dollars.117 
These are situations in which the researchers picked the 
subject matter based on knowledge that sufficient data were 
available for analysis, rather than because of the pressing 
need to do CBA of proposed regulation in a specific setting. 
In most financial settings calling for CBA of corrective rules, 
the necessary data are unlikely to exist and collecting them 
may be unfeasibly costly or time consuming. 
 
115 See Henry G. Manne, Economics and Financial Regulation, 35 
REGULATION 20, 22 (2012). 
116 Jerry A. Hausman, Valuation of New Goods Under Perfect and 
Imperfect Competition, in THE ECONOMICS OF NEW GOODS 209, 228, 234–35 
(Timothy F. Bresnahan & Robert J. Gordon eds., 1997). (“The correct 
economic approach to the evaluation of new goods has been known for over 
fifty years . . . . However, it has not been implemented by government 
statistical agencies, perhaps because of its complications and data 
requirements. Data are now available.”). 
117 Peter Cohen, Robert Hahn, Jonathan Hall, Steven Levitt & Robert 
Metcalfe, Using Big Data to Estimate Consumer Surplus: The Case of Uber 
1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 22627, 2016). 
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B. Market Failure as a Basis for Corrective Rules 
The neoclassical model states that people acting in their 
own self-interest will efficiently allocate resources only if 
they bear the full costs or capture the full benefits of their 
actions.118 When some costs or benefits fall on third parties—
so-called externalities—the decision maker’s resource 
allocation decisions could exceed or fall short of optimality, 
and the market is said to fail. Every undergraduate 
economics major learns that market failure owing to 
externalities justifies government regulation. 
  
 
118 See supra Section IV.A. 
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Figure 2: Externalities 
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Figure 2 illustrates the accepted mechanics of how 
externalities lead to market failure. Panel A shows a 
negative externality while Panel B shows a positive 
externality, and in either case, the activity in question may 
involve a nontraded good such as driving on open-access 
public roads. Line MPB in Panel A reflects the marginal 
private benefits to a decision maker from engaging in some 
socially productive activity, such as driving to work during 
rush hour. Because the decision maker captures all relevant 
benefits, there are no external benefits that spill over on 
others; thus, marginal private benefit is identical to 
marginal social benefit (MPB ≡ MSB). On the other side of 
the equation, the decision maker’s private costs are given by 
MPC. Being self-interested, he or she will engage in Ao units 
of the activity, where MPB = MPC. According to standard 
welfare analysis, at Ao the decision maker does too much of 
the activity, neglecting to consider the marginal external 
costs, EC, that spill over on others in the form of traffic 
congestion. From society’s standpoint optimality occurs at 
A*, where marginal social benefits just equal marginal social 
costs; MSB = MSC ≡ MPC + EC. Social welfare falls short of 
the optimum by the shaded triangle, a deadweight loss 
reflecting resources use whose social value falls short of its 
social cost, more generally referred to as forgone gains from 
trade. 
The mechanics of positive externalities follow much the 
same reasoning, shown in Panel B. Here, the decision maker 
equates his or her marginal private benefits with marginal 
private costs and ignores any external benefits that spill onto 
others because he or she is unable to charge a price for them. 
The decision maker ends up doing too little of the activity; Â 
falls short of A*. The shaded triangle shows the associated 
loss in social welfare. A relevant example comes from the 
principal-agent setting.119 The agent is charged with acting 
to increase the principal’s wealth, but, although the agent 
bears the full costs of such actions, he or she normally 
receives only a small fraction of the associated benefits. The 
 
119 Garbade & Silber, supra note 30, at 495–98. 
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decision maker therefore stops short of the activity level that 
maximizes the net social benefits. For example, a retail 
securities broker might exert too little effort identifying 
profitable trades for his or her client’s benefit or under-
search for price improvement on trades the client orders. 
A simple solution to the problem of too much or too little 
activity is government mandates, such as limiting to A* the 
number of travelers allowed to enter the roadway. A common 
example of a solution to negative externalities is high-
occupancy vehicle (“HOV”) restrictions requiring a minimum 
number of vehicle occupants on specific roads at peak travel 
times. Speed limits, in essence, are another. Examples of 
mandates to solve positive externalities include required 
vaccinations and minimum schooling requirements. 
Mandates can be cumbersome because they require the 
regulator to gather information to identify A* and leave little 
discretion to market participants about how to make efficient 
adjustments in response. 
Corrective taxes are an alternative to quantity 
mandates.120 By forcing travelers to bear the full social cost 
of their travel decisions, for example, a road tax equal to EC 
is said to correct the market failure and restore socially 
optimal resource allocation while leaving people free to 
choose how much and when to travel. They naturally choose 
activity level A* rather than Ao. Gasoline and cigarette taxes 
are arguable examples of corrective taxation. Where feasible, 
corrective taxes impose a smaller information burden on the 
regulator than government mandates because they allow 
market participants to make economizing adjustments as 
long as they are willing to pay the tax. 
Two additional responses are available to correct market 
failure. One is for the government to do nothing and the 
other is for it to require one party to compensate the other by 
establishing or changing the rule of liability. These 
possibilities are discussed below. 
 
120 See MANKIW, supra note 108, at 495–96. 
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C. A Closer Look at Market Failure 
Coase famously introduced the “costs of market 
transactions” into the market failure debate and traced the 
implications for the optimal rule of liability.121 He used the 
example of a rancher’s cattle straying and trampling the 
neighboring farmer’s crops, a garden-variety negative 
externality that the common law regularly addressed under 
the law of nuisance, either with a liability rule or with a 
property rule.122 Under the implausible assumption of zero 
transaction costs, he showed that the rule of liability would 
have no effect on the number of cattle the rancher raises or 
the extent of crop damage (resource allocation). Whether 
ranchers have to pay for damage to farmers’ crops or farmers 
have to pay ranchers to reduce their herd size, efficient 
resource allocation will prevail. 
This irrelevance result has since come to be known as the 
Coase Theorem.123 But Coase never touted his analysis as 
“the Coase Theorem,” nor did he endorse the relevance of 
zero transaction costs to the real world. As he lamented:  
A better approach would seem to be to start our 
analysis with a situation approximating that which 
actually exists, to examine the effects of a proposed 
policy change and to attempt to decide whether the 
new situation would be, in total, better or worse than 
 
121 See Coase, supra note 25. The Problem of Social Cost was the 
culmination of several of Coase’s earlier works. See generally R. H. Coase, 
The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1959); Coase, 
supra note 30. 
122 See Coase, supra note 25, at 2–6. In a nutshell, a liability rule is 
one enforced by judicially assessed damages, while a property rule is one 
enforced through injunction or specific performance. Guido Calabresi & A. 
Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One 
View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1972). 
123 The Coase Theorem is virtually identical to the Modigliani and 
Miller Irrelevance Theorem (under given assumptions, a firm’s capital 
structure–how it is financed–will have no effect on firm value). See Franco 
Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance 
and the Theory of Investment, 48 AM. ECON. REV. 261 (1958). For such 
theorems, the explanatory power comes from relaxing the underlying 
assumptions. 
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the original one. In this way, conclusions for policy 
would have some relevance to the actual situation.124 
 In a Coasean framework, it begs the question to label one 
party the victim and the other the wrongdoer, or to say that 
one party injures or imposes external costs on another. 
Which parties courts deem as wrongdoers and which they 
deem as the victims is the outcome of a legal process 
influenced by the costs of transacting. Two parties simply 
want to use a scarce resource in mutually incompatible ways, 
an inevitable condition in a world of scarcity. The rancher 
whose cattle stray is no more economically responsible—the 
cause—for injury to the farmer as a result of increasing his 
or her herd size than the farmer is responsible for planting 
crops where cattle are likely to stray. In Coase’s words, “[I]t 
is true that there would be no crop damage without the 
cattle. It is equally true that there would be no crop damage 
without the crops.”125 Injury, or damage, is a reciprocal 
problem, and, operationally, who ends up with the right to 
injure whom is determined by the costs of transacting. 
Transaction cost economics generates testable scientific 
hypotheses about how the parties’ choice of organization 
varies at the margin when the costs of transacting change 
over time or differ cross-sectionally. To generate implications 
for testing, it is absolutely essential that the researcher 
identify the equilibrium conditions that the parties face 
inclusive of transaction costs. 
Looking back to Figure 2, a transaction cost equilibrium 
occurs where the marginal cost of transacting equals the 
marginal “external cost” or “external benefit,” depending on 
the situation. For any level of activity beyond Ao in Figure 2, 
the gains from correcting the level of activity exceed the 
transaction costs, consistent with market equilibrium. The 
length of line segments AB and CD in Figure 2 reflect 
margin transaction costs at Ao. If the cost of transacting at 
Ao in Panel A of Figure 2 were less than the value reflected 
in line segment AB, the parties would find it in their interest 
 
124 Coase, supra note 25, at 43. 
125 Id. at 13. 
2018.3_JOHNSEN_FINAL  
732 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2018 
to move to a lower and more socially efficient level of 
activity. At Ao the marginal private cost (MPC) of the activity 
is equal to the marginal social cost (MSC), and the outcome 
is socially efficient. The parties are in equilibrium in the 
sense that neither is interested in adjusting given the 
transaction costs they would incur to do so. 
Whereas the pre-Coasean market failure rationale for 
government regulation envisioned a frictionless world out of 
equilibrium owing to externalities that need correcting, the 
Coasean framework envisions a world in equilibrium once 
having accounted for the cost of transacting. Inefficient 
resource allocation leaves money on the table and creates the 
opportunity for market participants to cooperate to capture 
untapped gains from trade. This inefficiency can sensibly 
persist only where the cost of transacting exceeds the value 
of these untapped gains. Transaction costs are real costs, and 
it pays to spend a dollar transacting only if doing so would 
generate more than a dollar in gains. Given established legal 
and regulatory rules, private parties will internalize, or 
correct, all externalities that the cost of transacting allows 
because doing so makes them better off. 
Where the parties negotiate face-to-face, as in retail 
securities brokerage, transaction costs can be presumed 
sufficiently low such that they have an ever-present 
tendency to move toward optimal resource allocation. 
Undoubtedly, in some subset of cases, courts of law or 
government regulators can step in to establish a rule of 
liability that reduces the cost of transacting, thereby 
allowing the parties to capture further gains from trade. In 
the event traditional CBA is problematic or incomplete, 
transaction cost analysis provides a workable and 
informative alternative. It would require the regulator to 
describe the initial equilibrium inclusive of transaction costs, 
and then to show how the proposed rule will likely reduce 
them, moving the parties to a superior equilibrium.126 The 
 
126 The first scholarly article to propose this approach appears to be D. 
Bruce Johnsen, Transaction Cost-Benefit Analysis, with Applications to 
Financial Regulation (Mar. 6, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), 
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informational burden this puts on the regulator in modest 
transaction cost settings is far lower than for traditional 
CBA. It avoids a grand accounting for aggregate costs and 
benefits based on demand and supply functions that are 
unobservable and not meant to be anything more than 
mental constructs to generate testable hypotheses. 
Transaction cost analysis requires merely a qualitative 
explanation for why, “at the margin” the rule is likely to 
reduce the relevant transaction costs, which is more 
consistent than the neoclassical model’s core comparative 
statics role. 
V. A TRANSACTION COST ASSESSMENT OF 
REGULATION BEST INTEREST 
A. Preliminaries 
RBI’s economic analysis relies on influential work by 
Jensen and Meckling on agency theory for its theoretical 
foundation.127 Unfortunately, it fails to fully decipher some 
of the obvious economic implications of their analysis for the 
market for investment advice. A fundamental example is 
that RBI treats conflicts of interest as a market failure. 
Conflicts of interest arise from the information asymmetry 
inherent in specialization. The more specialized the parties 
are, the greater the information asymmetry and the greater 
the potential losses from self-seeking behavior. But 
specialization has tremendous benefits and, in general, it 
will proceed only as long as the net benefits to principals and 
agents exceed the expected losses. The parties are willing to 
tolerate conflicts of interest and information asymmetry 




127 See supra note 107 and accompanying text; see also Jensen & 
Meckling, supra note 30. The proposing release also cites Coase. 
Regulation Best Interest, 83 Fed. Reg. 21,574, 21,630 n.378 (proposed May 
9, 2018) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240). For assessing the best interest 
rule, agency costs can be treated as a subset of transaction costs applied to 
principal-agent relations.  
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customs, and other mechanisms to ensure, in general, that 
they can trust one another trading in relative ignorance. It 
would be socially wasteful for the ignorant party (the 
principal) to incur the costs of duplicating the information 
the informed party (the agent) already has.128 In general, 
rather than being a reflection of market failure, persistent 
conflicts of interest and information asymmetries are a 
reflection of market success. 
While it is true that agents violate principals’ trust from 
time to time, the magnitude of the problem is undoubtedly 
small relative to the total gains from specialization. No doubt 
some gains from trade go untapped owing to the potential for 
breach of trust. Gains from trade that are not clearly 
assigned could be entirely dissipated through costly attempts 
by one or the other party to capture or protect them.129 But 
because the parties want to avoid dissipation, they will find 
it in their interest to develop mitigating arrangements to the 
extent the costs of transacting allow.130 
As principals, retail brokerage clients can and do monitor 
their brokers’ investment recommendations by comparing 
investment performance with friends, consulting industry 
publications and other metrics, and seeking satisfaction for 
dramatic underperformance through binding arbitration, etc. 
Brokers take measures to bond their fidelity by, for example, 
providing detailed account statements that give snapshots of 
performance, subjecting themselves to binding arbitration, 
and subjecting themselves and their firms to reputational 
loss for wrongdoing. 
In any principal-agent setting, transaction costs are low 
enough that the parties can engage in some measure of face-
to-face bargaining, and market mechanisms are therefore 
likely to push their contract terms and other arrangements 
toward efficiency. This is especially likely in securities 
 
128 Avoiding information duplication is apparently one reason the 
securities laws focus on mandating disclosure rather than mandating 
substantive behavior. 
129 See generally Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, 
Monopolies, and Theft, 5 W. ECON. J. 224 (1967). 
130 See Barzel, supra note 30. 
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markets because of the huge numbers of brokers and 
investment advisers, who are in constant competition among 
themselves to manage retail investors’ money.131 The same 
goes for mutual funds, insurance products, banks, and 
financial planners. Many brokerage firm clients hold assets 
in both brokerage accounts and advisory accounts,132 and 
they can easily shift money between them for any reason. In 
a very real sense, the suitability rule for retail brokers has 
long been in competition with the fiduciary duty of 
investment advisers. It must be true, all things considered 
(including the costs of transacting), that the marginal 
investor is indifferent between these alternatives. 
As the RBI proposing release correctly recognizes, any 
regulation that reduces agency costs is very likely to increase 
trade and make the affected parties better off. The “output 
effect” is a rough-and-ready basis for evaluating a proposed 
rule.133 The release also recognizes that principals and 
agents are capable of reducing residual losses through 
efficient economic organization.134 Owing to agency costs, 
however, it correctly argues that the parties may be unable 
to contract over certain actions, a problem that “can” best be 
addressed by establishing a mandatory standard of 
liability.135 Yet it repeatedly emphasizes the inability to 
quantify either the costs or the benefits of the best interest 
standard relative to the suitability rule because the 
necessary data is unavailable.136 Indeed, the release 
candidly states that it is unable to determine the extent to 
 
131 See Regulation Best Interest, 83 Fed. Reg. 21,574, 21,632–39 
(proposed May 9, 2018) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240). 
132 2011 STUDY, supra note 6, at 11. 
133 This is the same test that Robert Bork proposed to separate 
efficient from inefficient conduct in the antitrust setting. See Robert H. 
Bork, A Reply to Professors Gould and Yamey, 76 YALE L.J. 731 (1967); see 
also ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX (1978). 
134 Regulation Best Interest, 83 Fed. Reg. at 21,630–31. 
135 Id. 
136 See id. at 21,643–44, 21,647–48, 21,656, 21,658–59. 
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which brokers currently serve their own interests at the 
expense of their retail clients.137 
The SEC has not only failed to empirically identify the 
likely benefits of the solution it proposes, but it is unable to 
empirically demonstrate there is any problem to be solved. 
Despite this, and despite its claim that investors are 
routinely confused over their investment representative’s 
status and legal duties, it repeatedly asserts that a best 
interest standard would better match investors’ 
“expectations” than a suitability rule.138 It provides no 
plausible empirical evidence that investors actually hold 
such expectations, let alone how they might have formed 
such expectations over the course of decades under the 
suitability rule. 
It is one thing to argue that some legal standard is 
necessary because certain attributes of agency relationships 
might be noncontractible and quite another to conclude, with 
no theoretical or empirical support, that the best interest 
standard better mitigates conflicts of interest than the 
suitability rule. This was exactly the American Equity court’s 
point when it said that it is not enough for the SEC to argue 
that “any” rule “could” promote efficiency, competition, and 
capital formation.139 It must make a plausible showing that 
the specific rule it selected will do so relative to the 
established baseline. 
The RBI proposing release raises several empirical 
questions: Which legal standard is more efficient? Why does 
the rule of liability matter? What transaction costs impede 
the parties from solving the purported problem? These are 
questions the SEC can and should address with specificity 
before attempting to correct a problem that may not even 
exist. Simply stating that the broker-client relationship 
suffers from conflicts of interest that may harm clients is 
 
137 Id. at 21,658 (“[T]he Commission lacks data on the extent to which 
current broker-dealer recommendations are subject to conflicts of interest 
related to financial incentives”). 
138 See id. at 21,584–85, 21,630–31, 21,642–44. 
139 Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co. v. SEC, 613 F.3d 166, 178 (D.C. Cir. 
2010). 
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insufficient, not least because any form of organization will 
suffer from conflicts of interest on some dimension or other 
as long as transacting is costly. Residual attempts at wealth 
transfer will always occur. 
The RBI proposing release doubles down on its empirical 
ignorance by proposing that the parties be prohibited from 
contracting out of the best interest standard.140 Jensen and 
Meckling, and Coase, both make clear that private 
contracting is a powerful mechanism for averting what 
might otherwise constitute market failures. By proposing a 
mandatory rule rather than a default rule, the release 
ignores this and would freeze the state of economic 
organization in place, despite ample theoretical and 
empirical evidence in the scholarly literature141 and 
established antitrust case law142  that the dynamism of 
private contracting can be remarkably effective. Imposing a 
mandatory best interest standard may increase the costs of 
transacting rather than lower them, and the burden of 
persuasion lies with the SEC according to federal case law 
and its own internal pronouncements. 
B. The Best Interest Standard 
The RBI proposing release repeatedly states that brokers 
are conflicted when giving their clients investment advice, 
especially by the financial incentives that determine their 
compensation.143 On one hand, the release speculates that 
under the suitability rule, brokers might give advice that 
 
140 Regulation Best Interest, 83 Fed. Reg. at 21,595. 
141 Purely by way of example, see Allen & Lueck, supra note 30; 
Benham, supra note 31; Cheung, supra note 30; Johnsen, The Formation 
and Protection of Property Rights Among the Southern Kwakiutl Indians, 
supra note 30; Klein & Leffler, supra note 30; Libecap & Lueck, supra note 
30; Masten & Crocker, supra note 30; Masten, Meehan & Snyder, The 
Costs of Organization, supra note 30; Masten, Meehan & Snyder, Vertical 
Integration in the U.S. Auto Industry: A Note on the Influence of 
Transaction Specific Assets, supra note 30; Telser, supra note 31. 
142 See, e.g., Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977); 
Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007). 
143  Regulation Best Interest, 83 Fed. Reg. at 21,574–76. 
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yields ’the maximum expected return for a given risk (net of 
fees) for their clients, thereby serving their clients’ best 
interest.144 On the other hand, they might adjust their 
advice, more or less, to increase their own compensation 
while recommending investments likely to underperform, 
thereby compromising their clients’ best interest. Absent 
unambiguous agency theory to suggest retail brokers 
systematically give their clients tainted advice, the issue is 
entirely an empirical one, and yet the release ignores much 
of the relevant literature and case law that would help 
resolve the issue.  
Garbade and Silber provide an agency cost analysis of 
securities brokers’ fiduciary duty of “best execution” when 
trading on their clients’ behalf.145 Although their analysis 
does not deal specifically with brokers giving investment 
advice to retail clients, it provides a useful example of how 
transaction costs influence economic organization. The 
authors examine the general agency law rule that a broker 
has a fiduciary duty to “act solely for the benefit of [his 
customer] in all matters connected with his agency” as well 
as the SEC’s specific formulation of this rule requiring a 
broker who accepts a customer’s market sell order “to sell the 
stock at the highest possible price.”146 
A broker’s job is to search for attractive trading 
opportunities on the client’s behalf, but search is costly, and 
in a competitive market principals must compensate agents 
for these costs.  The authors question why it would be in the 
client’s interest for the broker to spend a dollar to discover a 
bid price that is less than a dollar higher than the highest 
bid the agent has already found, which is what the SEC’s 
“highest possible price” rule appeared to require.  The rule 
clearly fails a cost-benefit test.  The above statements of 
 
144 The proposing release points out that the suitability rule, as 
applied by FINRA and common law courts, requires brokers to give the 
investment advice that serves their clients’ best interest. See id. at 21,577 
n.15. 
145 See Garbade & Silber, supra note 30. 
146 Id. at 493 (internal quotations omitted) (citations omitted) 
(emphasis added). 
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fiduciary duty are therefore economically confused and, if 
taken literally, legally unworkable. Only in the implausible 
case where search is costless do these rules make economic 
sense. 
A more economically rational general expression of the 
fiduciary duty requires the fiduciary to act with the “same 
degree of fidelity and care” as an “ordinarily prudent man . . . 
in the management of his own affairs of like magnitude and 
importance.147 Not surprisingly, the SEC has since revised 
its regulations to require retail brokers merely “to seek the 
most favorable terms reasonably available under the 
circumstances” on their clients’ behalf.148 
Garbade and Silber’s highest-possible-price example of 
“best execution” applies equally to RBI’s best interest 
standard, which would appear to require the broker to spend 
a dollar to generate less than a dollar in benefit for the 
client. It also compounds the economic confusion by 
prohibiting brokers and their clients from adjusting by 
private agreement to the literal statement of the legal rule in 
an economically rational way.  
According to Garbade and Silber, a sufficient fraction of 
clients in the marketplace know their brokers have an 
incentive to act in their own self-interest, and competition 
will therefore set the fee schedule to encourage efficient 
broker behavior. The article identifies the contractual 
arrangements that mitigate conflicts of interest by properly 
motivating brokers to trade on their clients’ behalf, even 
though the parties know this will fall short of bringing the 
highest (or lowest) possible price.149 Such arrangements 
include: 1) explicit contracting to limit an agent’s discretion, 
such as by placing a limit order rather than a market 
 
147 See, e.g., Alaska Plastics, Inc., v. Coppock, 621 P.2d 270, 278 
(Alaska 1980) (citing Nanfito v. Tekseed Hybrid Co., 341 F. Supp 240, 244 
(D. Neb. 1972)). 
148 Order Execution Obligations, 61 Fed. Reg. 48,290, 48,322 (Sept. 
12, 1996) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240). 
149 Garbade & Silber, supra note 30, at 495. 
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order;150 2) bonding by agents to validate claims of superior 
execution; and 3) collective action to reduce the transaction 
costs to clients of monitoring broker performance ex post.151 
As a general matter, the authors show that rational 
clients will not want their brokers to uncover the “highest” 
available price and that the market establishes brokerage 
commissions accordingly.152 They also show that the fine-
grained patterns of economic organization in securities 
brokerage are consistent with the hypothesis that brokers 
and their clients cooperate to maximize joint gains from 
trade, net of transaction costs, rather than exclusively 
focusing on the client’s welfare.153 The SEC can and should 
conduct similar studies regarding brokers’ provision of 
investment advice to retail clients before imposing a non-
negotiable best interest requirement on them. 
The SEC’s discussion of broker conflicts rests on the 
unsupported, and unsupportable, conclusion that any system 
of compensation other than one that is entirely neutral 
across different investment products necessarily taints the 
broker’s advice and compromises his or her clients’ best 
interest. The weight of the scholarly empirical work on 
conflicts of interest suggests otherwise, but RBI ignores it. 
By way of example, competent scholarly research from 
experimental economics suggests that in some cases 
mandatory disclosure of conflicts can actually hurt the 
principal. Cain, Lowenstein, and Moore show that 
“disclosure can increase the bias in advice because it leads 
 
150 Id. at 498. With a market order, the client instructs the broker to 
buy or sell at the prevailing market price, whatever that might happen to 
be. With a limit order, the client instructs the broker to buy at a price no 
greater that $X/share or sell at a price no less than $Y/share. With a 
market order, the broker earns a commission no matter what price he or 
she uncovers during his or her search, whereas with a limit order the 
broker earns a commission only if he or she uncovers the stated limit price 
or better. The authors argue that limit orders give brokers more incentive 
to search for better prices. Brokers and their clients transact using many 
different types of orders, each with their own built-in incentives. 
151 Id. at 498–501. 
152 Id. at 495–98. 
153 Id. at 494–95. 
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[agents] to feel morally licensed and strategically encouraged 
to exaggerate their advice even further.”154 
In a 2007 article, Mehran and Stulz provide an extensive 
literature review of conflicts of interest in financial services. 
They conclude: 
[A]lthough conflicts of interest are omnipresent when 
contracting is costly and parties are imperfectly 
informed, there are important factors that mitigate 
their impact and, strikingly, it is possible for 
customers of financial institutions to benefit from the 
existence of such conflicts. The empirical literature 
reaches conclusions that differ across types of 
conflicts of interest but are overall more ambivalent 
and certainly more benign than the conclusions 
drawn by journalists and politicians from mostly 
anecdotal evidence. 
. . . . 
The existence of a conflict of interest within a 
financial institution does not mean that, in 
equilibrium, the customers of that institution will be 
harmed . . . . [A] variety of mechanisms help control 
conflicts of interest and their impact. For instance, a 
financial institution’s concerns about its reputation 
might lead it to control conflicts of interest so that 
they have no material impact on its customers. 
Alternatively, a financial institution’s customers can 
rationally take into account how these conflicts affect 
the financial institution’s actions [and adjust 
accordingly].155 
 
154 Daylian M. Cain, George Loewenstein & Don A. Moore, The Dirt 
on Coming Clean: Perverse Effects of Disclosing Conflicts of Interest, 34 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 1, 1 (2005). The SEC has shown modest appreciation for the 
general point that disclosure can make a problem worse. In 2004, it 
withdrew a proposal to require funds to provide specific disclosure of how 
they detect market timing because the disclosure would likely provide 
market timers with a “road map” to evade detection. See Disclosure 
Regarding Market Timing and Selective Disclosure of Portfolio Holdings, 
69 Fed. Reg. 22,300 (Apr. 23, 2004) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 239, 
274). 
155 Hamid Mehran & René M. Stulz, The Economics of Conflicts of 
Interest, 85 J. FIN. ECON. 267, 267, 269 (2007). 
2018.3_JOHNSEN_FINAL  
742 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2018 
Following the DOL’s Regulatory Impact Analysis for the 
Fiduciary Rule, the RBI proposing release pinpoints front-
end sales loads as a particularly troubling form of broker 
compensation.156 Section 22 of the ICA allows mutual funds 
to impose minimum sales loads on any broker who sells the 
fund’s shares to retail investors, as set out in the fund’s 
prospectus.157 Recall that with a standard front-end load, the 
client might pay one hundred dollars to the broker but 
receive an investment in the fund of only ninety-five dollars. 
The brokerage firm receives the five-dollar front-end load, 
which it splits with the individual broker according to 
internal firm compensation policy. It would be a prospectus 
violation for a broker to depart from this prescription. 
Just as in any other retail setting, the price the client 
pays for load shares includes compensation for the costs of 
marketing the good, which in this setting is itemized and 
disclosed to the client in the fund’s prospectus. The DOL and 
SEC believe front-end loads raise serious conflicts of interest 
because a broker might recommend a load fund over a no-
load fund to increase his or her compensation, even though 
the two funds have the same style, investment objective, 
expected return, and risk profile.158  
Minimum sales loads are a garden-variety form of resale 
price maintenance (“RPM”), according to which a product 
manufacturer contractually obligates its independent 
retailers to charge no less than a stated price. Rather than 
compete on price, retailers—in this case retail securities 
brokers—compete by providing customers—in this case retail 
investors—with valuable information and other point-of-sale 
services on which the retailer might otherwise skimp, 
contrary to the manufacturer’s wishes and consumers’ best 
interest.  
For over one hundred years federal courts summarily 
condemned RPM as illegal per se under the Sherman 
 
156 Regulation Best Interest, 83 Fed. Reg. 21,574, 21,645 n.460 
(proposed May 9, 2018) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240). 
157 15 U.S.C. § 80a–22 (2012). 
158 See Regulation Best Interest, 83 Fed. Reg. at 21,645 n.460. 
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Antitrust Act of 1890, thinking it facilitated monopoly.159 Yet 
in the 2007 case Leegin v. PSKS, the Supreme Court 
overruled the use of the per se rule in this context, finding 
that RPM, like virtually all vertical arrangements, likely 
provides tremendous benefits to consumers.160 The Court 
pointed out that the economic scholarship is now “replete 
with procompetitive justifications for a manufacturer’s use of 
resale price maintenance.”161 Absent RPM, a retailer can 
free ride by neglecting to provide point-of-sale services, 
setting a low price, and luring customers away from high-
service retailers after the customer has already acquired 
their services.162 High-service retailers could be driven from 
the market. A degenerate equilibrium would ensue in which 
consumers value retail services but no retailer provides 
them. Manufacturers would then have to find alternative 
ways to provide consumers with valuable information that 
involve higher transaction costs, or consumers would have to 
inform themselves. The output effect would be negative and 
would very likely reduce net social benefits. 
 Among its pro-competitive effects, RPM allows the 
manufacturer to avoid or economize on monitoring its 
retailers, which reduces transaction costs. In the Court’s 
words, “[i]t may be difficult and inefficient for a 
manufacturer to make and enforce a contract with a retailer 
specifying the different services the retailer must 
perform.”163 RPM avoids the manufacturer-retailer conflict 
of interest. As the Court concluded, “the interests of 
manufacturers and consumers are aligned with respect to 
retailer profit margins.”164 
 
159 See Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 
(1911), overruled by Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 511 
U.S. 877 (2007). 
160 Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 
907 (2007). 
161 Id. at 889. 
162 Id. at 890–91. 
163 Id. at 892. 
164 Id. at 896. 
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One of Coase’s fundamental insights regarding external 
costs is that injury is reciprocal.165 In the retail broker-client 
relationship, clients also face conflicts of interest that may 
undermine the parties’ long-run interests. A client might 
split his or her wealth between brokerage accounts at two 
different firms, one with a full-service broker that provides 
advice and other valuable services but sells only mutual 
funds subject to up-front loads and the other with a discount 
broker that provides no services but sells no-load funds. The 
client could take the full-service broker’s advice as to what 
mutual funds are appropriate for his or her circumstances 
and use it, in part, to invest in similar no-load funds through 
a discount brokerage account, thereby reducing the total 
broker compensation paid. 
Mutual fund companies that impose up-front loads on the 
sale of their shares apparently believe those investors who 
buy their shares are better off receiving the services and 
paying the load. In making this decision, the fund company’s 
profit or loss depends on how the load affects its costs of 
capital. If broker-provided services are worth more to retail 
investors than the load they pay, the arrangement will 
increase their expected investment returns (net of the costs 
of information provision) and the investment company’s cost 
of capital falls. If not, it rises. Just as manufacturer and 
consumer interests are aligned with respect to retailer 
compensation, there is little reason to distrust the 
investment company to make the load-fee decision other 
than to maximize the gains from trade for given costs of 
transacting. The gains are then shared in some way between 
the parties. All costs and benefits of the load decisions are 
internalized to the investment company. 
The industry’s use of front-end loads has evolved to 
mitigate any residual conflicts of interest. Depending on the 
share class, many fund companies have adopted back-end 
loads and even made them contingent on certain events or 
actions by the parties, such as minimum holding period 
 
165 See Coase, supra note 25. 
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requirements.166 Evidence the RBI proposing release cites 
suggests that these and other iterations have worked to 
better align the parties’ incentives by reducing transaction 
costs.167  
The RPM analysis applies equally to full-service 
brokerage. Brokers’ primary function is to execute securities 
trades in the secondary market on their clients’ behalf rather 
than to give investment advice.168 They are normally paid a 
commission of pennies per share to do so. Discount brokers 
charge low commissions but provide no investment advice.169 
Full-service brokers charge premium commissions but also 
provide their clients with incidental advice.170 Why would an 
investor, as principal, want to pay a premium commission for 
securities trades that he or she could get for far less from a 
discount broker?  
As with point-of-sale services, sound investment advice 
and the execution of securities trades are complements. The 
better the advice a broker provides his or her client, the more 
trades the client will do, the greater the client’s investment 
returns, and, appropriately, the higher the broker’s 
compensation. Bundling advice and execution together is 
necessary because transacting investment advice 
independently is noncontractible. How is an investor to 
assess the quality of investment advice barring any further 
association with the provider?171 The transaction costs 
 
166 See Regulation Best Interest, 83 Fed. Reg. 21,574, 21,642 
(proposed May 9, 2018) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240). 
167 See id. at 21,657. 
168 Id. at 21,632. 
169 Id. at 21,574–75. 
170 Id. 
171 In the market for consumer goods, Consumer Reports provides 
information and advice that consumers might otherwise obtain from the 
product seller. Consumer Reports exists because some segment of 
consumer market believes product sellers face a conflict of interest in 
providing information about product quality. Repeated evidence shows 
that Consumer Reports is often wildly incorrect in its assessments. The 
problem is that consumers cannot punish it with a loss in sales of the 
underlying good if it is wrong. While it is true that consumers can stop 
consulting Consumer Reports if they are dissatisfied, this response does 
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investors would have to incur to verify the advice in most 
settings would be prohibitive. Paying brokers for (costly) 
advice only if they are willing to incur the costs of executing 
the associated trades is likely an informative signal to 
brokerage clients over the course of the potentially long-term 
relationship. Since the client knows the counterfactual, it is 
fairly easy for the marginal investor to assess the effect of 
the brokerage commissions on investment returns and to 
adjust patronage with the broker accordingly. The prospect 
of being terminated and losing a stream of premium 
commissions is an effective way to bond a broker’s 
performance in the provision of incidental investment advice. 
As with load fees, this kind of free riding reduces full-
service brokers’ ability to earn a return on their investment 
in providing incidental advice, which some investors value. 
Under RBI, many of these investors are likely to find 
themselves without advice, paying even higher commissions, 
or pushed into an otherwise less-preferred form of 
organization such as an advisory account that charges 
recurring fees. For small account holders who plan to trade 
infrequently, advisory accounts are expensive, even relative 
to full-service brokerage accounts.172 
One way a full-service broker might prevent clients from 
free riding is by convincing them to place their entire 
investment portfolio with him. Unfortunately, the 
transaction costs to the broker of confirming this are 
extremely high. Brokers likely address this problem by 
giving clients with larger accounts (a crude proxy for the 
client’s entire portfolio) preferential access to investment 
advice. 
Surely free riding by retail brokerage clients on their 
brokers’ investment advice is relevant to understanding why 
the rule of liability matters, and it is an issue the SEC staff 
should address both theoretically and empirically before 
imposing a mandatory best interest standard. 
 
not directly tie the marginal penalty Consumer Reports suffers to specific 
incorrect advice. 
172 See U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, FIDUCIARY RULE: INITIAL IMPACT 
ANALYSIS, 8, 11 (2017). 
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Pressed to its logical limit, RBI could injure investors 
rather than protect them. As with the “highest possible 
price” rule, the best interest standard seems to suggest that 
brokers must forgo a dollar of compensation to yield their 
client less than a dollar of expected investment returns. If 
taken literally, it could be interpreted to require brokers to 
work free of charge. Once having provided a client with 
investment advice, for example, the strict logic of the best 
interest rule could be construed to require brokers to advise 
their clients to open a discount brokerage account and to 
make the associated trades through that account. This is 
unsustainable, but at least in the short-term it is clearly in 
the client’s best interest. In the long term, clients must bear 
the cost of being informed if a degenerate equilibrium is to be 
avoided. 
The proposing release provides no explanation about how 
the best interest rule would distinguish between a given 
client’s short-term best interest and the long-term best 
interest of the market of current and potential brokerage 
clients. The suitability standard suffers no such paradox. 
The likely response, consistent with both the SEC’s 
abandonment of the strict highest-possible-price rule and 
current case law under the suitability standard, is that 
under the best interest standard brokers be permitted to 
earn “reasonable” compensation.173 But if so, how does the 
best interest standard improve on the suitability standard? 
Rather than being an improvement, it appears to inject 
substantial uncertainty into the retail broker-client 
relationship. 
The assumption imbedded in RBI is that the parties are 
competing for a fixed pie, and that any value the broker 
captures must therefore come at his or her clients’ expense. 
This stance fails to come to grips with economic reality. 
Investment advice generates benefits for clients but requires 
the parties to balance delicate trade-offs if they are to 
expand the pie. Since the broker receives only a tiny fraction 
 
173 See, e.g., FINRA, RULE 2121 (2014); FINRA, RULE 2122 (2014); 
FINRA, RULE 2341 (2017); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2012); 15 U.S.C. § 78o 
(2012). 
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of any benefits he or she generates for clients, the “problem,” 
if one exists at all, is that the broker will have too little 
incentive to make informed recommendations.  
There is nothing troubling about brokers charging clients 
for advice if doing so increases their account values net of 
commissions and other fees. But in noisy securities markets, 
advice expected to be profitable ex ante can look like bad or 
tainted advice ex post. By establishing an objective and 
contemporaneous basis for broker liability, however 
imperfect, the suitability rule guards against hindsight bias 
that could have a chilling effect on brokers’ willingness to 
make any recommendation at all. 
The RBI proposing release attempts to address this 
problem by specifying that the best interest obligation arises 
at the moment the broker gives the advice.174 The release 
fails to explain why the benefits of the best interest standard 
outweigh what could be enormous costs from legal 
uncertainty owing to hindsight bias.175 Indeed, it is 
completely silent on this issue. 
Absent clear evidence of self-dealing, common law courts 
are unlikely to hold a securities broker liable for selling a 
client a popular financial product, such as load fund shares 
that compete head-to-head against no-load shares or for 
accepting payments from proprietary mutual fund providers 
in exchange for marketing their investment products. This 
question has already been asked and answered for the SEC 
on at least one occasion involving revenue sharing,176 
 
174 See Regulation Best Interest, 83 Fed. Reg. at 21,592. 
175 Perhaps this is what the proposing release attempts to address 
when it states that the broker’s disclosure obligation would be subject to a 
negligence standard rather than a strict liability standard. See Regulation 
Best Interest, 83 Fed. Reg. at 21,604. 
176 2011 STUDY, supra note 6, at 56 n.253 (“Revenue sharing occurs 
when a broker-dealer is paid by a mutual fund in exchange for promoting 
the funds to the broker-dealer’s customers. When a broker-dealer makes a 
recommendation of a mutual fund as to which it receives revenue sharing 
payments, it must disclose the revenue sharing arrangement to the 
customer because it is information about the potential bias of the 
investment advice.”). 
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another broker-compensation practice the proposing release 
considers conflicted.177 
In re Morgan Stanley DW, Inc. was an SEC civil action 
against Morgan Stanley Dean Witter (“MSDW”) condemning 
its so-called “Partners Program.”178 At the time, fund 
supermarkets had recently become popular in brokerage 
houses everywhere. They give retail brokers a platform of 
proprietary and nonproprietary mutual funds to choose from 
in making investment recommendations to their clients.179 
Fund supermarkets limit the conflicts of interest brokers 
allegedly face in offering their firm’s proprietary funds by 
making a large number of nonproprietary funds available. 
Yet, as with consumer choice generally, the supermarket 
platform presents brokers with endless options, and the costs 
of being adequately informed about every fund in the 
supermarket are overwhelming.180 
The Partners Program gave preferred status, known as 
“shelf space,”181 to certain fund complexes, but it also 
 
177 See Regulation Best Interest, 83 Fed. Reg. at 21,603 n.205. 
178 Morgan Stanley DW, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 48789, 2003 
WL 22703073 (Nov. 17, 2003). 
179 A broker’s proprietary funds are those issued by an affiliated 
investment company. Nonproprietary funds are those issued by 
unaffiliated investment companies. See, for example, Nonproprietary vs. 
Proprietary Mutual Fund, ZACKS, https://finance.zacks.com/nonproprietary 
-vs-proprietary-mutual-fund-10416.html [https://perma.cc/GK6P-YW5T]. 
180 See, e.g., Alina Tugend, Too Many Choices: A Problem That Can 
Paralyze, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2010), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/27/your-money/27shortcuts.html 
[https://perma.cc/T9NR-AQSD]. 
181 Payment for shelf space is common in grocery retailing. See 
Benjamin Klein & Joshua D. Wright, The Economics of Slotting Contracts, 
50 J.L. ECON. 421, 421 (2007) (“Shelf space contracts are shown to be a 
consequence of the normal competitive process when retailer shelf space is 
promotional, in the sense that the shelf space induces profitable 
incremental individual manufacturer sales without drawing customers 
from competing stores. In these circumstances, retailer and manufacturer 
incentives do not coincide with regard to the provision of promotional shelf 
space, and manufacturers must enter shelf space contracts with retailers. 
Retailers are compensated for supplying promotional shelf space at least 
partially with a per-unit-time slotting fee when inter-retailer price 
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required MSDW brokers to attend certain informational 
meetings and presentations hosted by the fund advisers. 
MSDW undoubtedly designed the Partners Program to 
overcome the information problem by promoting the sale of 
its partners’ funds, including co-defendant Massachusetts 
Financial Services, through enhanced compensation to 
partnering retail brokers.  
The SEC found that the Partners Program created a 
conflict of interest for MSDW brokers because they “received 
additional compensation for the sale of the mutual funds of a 
select group of fund complexes.”182 The participating 
partners provided various general disclosures about the 
Program in periodic reports to the SEC and in their 
prospectuses, concerning payments to brokers who 
distributed fund shares.183 In the SEC’s opinion, however, 
“none adequately disclose[d] the preferred programs as such, 
nor [did] most provide sufficient facts about the preferred 
programs for investors to appreciate the dimension of the 
conflicts of interest inherent in them.”184 Despite the absence 
of serious investor complaints,185 the SEC found MSDW had 
engaged in securities fraud, ordered it to cease and desist, 
censured it, assessed it $50 million in disgorgement, pre-
judgment interest, and civil penalties, and required it to 
satisfy a list of twenty-eight ongoing compliance plans.186 
Federal courts dismissed nine of the eleven civil suits that 
followed the SEC enforcement action on the pleadings in 
 
competition on the particular product makes compensation with a lower 
wholesale price a more costly way to generate equilibrium retailer shelf 
space rents.”). 
182 Morgan Stanley DW, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 48,789, 2003 
WL 22703073, at *2 (Nov. 17, 2003). 
183 Id. at *5. 
184 Id. 
185 See D. Bruce Johnsen, The SEC’s Mistaken Ban on Directed 
Brokerage: A Transaction Cost Analysis, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1241, 1260 
(2008). 
186 Morgan Stanley DW, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 48,789, 2003 
WL 22703073, at *12 (Nov. 17, 2003). 
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favor of the defendants187 because they considered the 
payments to MSDW brokers immaterial to the average 
investor. Nonetheless, the SEC subsequently passed a rule 
prohibiting the practice in any form.188  
One notable but overlooked feature of the arrangement 
was that the brokers who sold fund shares received only a 
portion of their compensation on sale. The remainder was 
back-end loaded in the form of trailing payments that 
continued for one year as long the client retained his or her 
shares, terminating the moment he or she sold.189 If, as 
seems likely, retail investors are likely to discover and sell 
unsuitable investments within a year of buying, this method 
of broker compensation mitigates any tendency brokers 
might have to recommend ill-suited funds. This is an 
unremarkable but apparently overlooked form of bonding 
brokers’ fidelity. The bond reduced clients’ up-front 
transaction costs of assessing their broker’s investment 
advice. Nothing in the case documents indicates that the 
SEC was aware of or concerned about the positive effects of 
the program on broker incentives. 
Recall that the SEC’s 2011 Study of retail broker conflicts 
relied on a 2008 RAND Foundation report assessing retail 
investors’ understanding of various details regarding their 
 
187 Johnsen, supra note 185, at 1286 n.177; see also Siemers v. Wells 
Fargo & Co., No. C 05-04518 WHA, 2006 WL 2355411 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 
2006); Forsythe v. Sun Life Fin., Inc., 417 F. Supp. 2d 100, 108, 117 (D. 
Mass. 2006) (denying the motion to dismiss the Investment Company Act 
36(b) claim, but drastically narrowing it; the current disposition of this 
case is unknown). But see AIG Advisor Grp., No. 06 CV 1625(JG), 2007 WL 
1213395, at *7–9 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 2007); In re AIG Advisor Grp. Sec. 
Litig., 309 F. App’x 495 (2d Cir. 2009) (ruling that where broker-dealer 
received payments in form of revenue sharing and directed brokerage from 
mutual funds in exchange for recommending the funds to customers, 
omissions concerning such conflicts of interest are not immaterial as a 
matter of law). 
188 Prohibition on the Use of Brokerage Commissions to Finance 
Distribution, 69 Fed. Reg. 54,728 (Sept. 9, 2004) (to be codified at 17 
C.F.R. pt. 270). 
189 See Johnsen, supra note 185, at 1275. 
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investment accounts based on survey evidence.190 From this, 
the 2011 Study concluded that retail investors generally are 
unaware or confused “regarding the roles, titles, and legal 
obligations of investment advisers and broker-dealers, 
although [the report also finds] that investors generally were 
satisfied with their financial professionals.”191 
The proper economic inference from this observation is 
not that it reflects a “problem” to be solved but that most 
retail investors consider brokerage and advisory accounts to 
be sufficiently close substitutes and sufficiently 
unproblematic that it is not worth their time and effort to 
identify the finer differences between them. As in any retail 
setting, for the market to work well it is sufficient that some 
investors—those who are on the margin between alternative 
products, forms of organization, or legal protections—do 
their homework and allocate their funds accordingly. Few 
consumers know or care whether their soft drinks are made 
from corn syrup or cane sugar, for example, but a select few 
are knowledgeable of and sensitive to the difference. These 
marginal consumers’ decisions guide relative prices and 
other terms of trade in the market for soft drinks and no 
doubt in the market for investment advice, where far more is 
at stake.  
The proposing release points out that many brokerage 
firm clients maintain both a brokerage account and an 
advisory account.192 Many undoubtedly transfer funds 
between them from time to time, and brokerage firms 
normally make this easy and inexpensive. Assets move 
fluidly between broker and adviser accounts as their relative 
merits vary. The hypothesis that retail investors respond at 
the margin in this way to changed circumstances is testable 
and well within the SEC’s wherewithal and competence.193 
For example, it is widely reported that in anticipation of the 
DOL’s now-defunct fiduciary rule retail clients began 
 
190 See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
191 2011 STUDY, supra note 6, at v. 
192 Id. at 11. 
193 See, e.g., Stephen Choi & Marcel Kahan, The Market Penalty for 
Mutual Fund Scandals, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1021, 1028–29 (2007). 
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migrating away from transaction based-brokerage accounts 
and toward fee-based advisory accounts and other 
products.194 If investors respond as predicted to marginal 
shocks, doubt is cast on RBI’s shaky empirical foundation, 
specifically that retail investors are too ignorant to protect 
themselves from entering into sub-optimal business 
relationships on a significant scale. 
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
There is no such thing as a conflict-free transaction. Pay 
shop-floor workers by the hour and they will likely loaf and 
pad their hours. Pay them by the piece and they will likely 
abuse the employer’s equipment to increase output and their 
compensation. The conflict of interest problem amplifies 
where one party agrees to act on behalf of another, as in the 
broker-client relationship. The adviser-investor relationship 
is no different. Rather than charging a commission, 
investment advisers normally charge a periodic asset-based 
fee. It is widely recognized, for example, that an adviser who 
charges a high fee to cover the cost of actively managing the 
portfolio might refrain from making the effort and simply 
invest in an index. In noisy securities markets, it is difficult 
for investors to discover “closet indexing” and hold their 
advisers accountable for misconduct, even under a fiduciary 
standard. 
So-called “wrap fee” programs in which clients pay for 
brokerage and advisory services with a single all-in-one 
management fee also pose conflicts of interest.195 Investment 
advisory clients normally authorize the adviser to use 
portfolio assets to pay brokerage commissions in exchange 
for portfolio trades. This can include paying full-service 
 
194 See Regulation Best Interest, 83 Fed. Reg. 21,574, 21,582 
(proposed May 9, 2018) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240); Mark Schoeff, 
Jr., The Legacy of the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule: Almost Gone, but Never 




195 See 2011 STUDY, supra note 6, at 7 n.7. 
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institutional brokers a high commission in partial exchange 
for investment advice or research—so-called “soft dollar 
brokerage”—an arrangement some consider fraught with 
conflicts of interest.196 
Retail investors therefore face a trade-off between 
alternative conflicts of interest when deciding whether to 
place their money with a broker or with an investment 
adviser. Nothing in the RBI proposing release even purports 
to address the relative magnitude of broker conflicts under 
the suitability rule and investment adviser conflicts under 
the best interest standard. 
If merely pointing out a conflict of interest is enough to 
justify regulation, there is no principled limit to regulation. 
There can be little doubt Congress intended to address this 
general problem by imposing on the SEC the empirical 
requirement that it assess a rule’s likely effect on efficiency, 
competition, and capital formation, which federal courts 
have interpreted to mandate some kind of plausible CBA. 
Yet the RBI proposing release states that the data necessary 
to perform a traditional CBA are unavailable. As a result, it 
clearly fails to provide adequate empirical support for 
imposing a best interest standard on retail brokers. 
To correct this shortcoming, the SEC should start with 
the foundational questions any regulator should ask in the 
context of direct trading relationships: Why does the rule of 
liability matter? What transaction costs prevent the parties 
from maximizing the gains from trade? What marginal effect 
is the best interest standard likely to have on the costs of 
transacting? Answering these questions is far easier and less 
information intensive than performing the grand accounting 
for costs and benefits that traditional CBA requires. 
The RBI proposing release assumes the world is out of 
equilibrium and that retail investors are virtually helpless to 
protect themselves at any cost. But there is no testable 
economic theory of disequilibrium capable of informing 
 
196 Id. at 24 n.95. For an analysis showing that soft dollar brokerage 
solves rather than worsens conflicts of interest, see D. Bruce Johnsen, The 
SEC’s 2006 Soft Dollar Guidance: Law and Economics, 30 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1545 (2009). 
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regulatory policy. Sensible regulation must be premised on 
understanding why, and under what current circumstances, 
observed market practices reflect an equilibrium determined 
in part by the costs of transacting and how government 
regulation can make things better by reducing them.  
Prohibiting the parties from contracting around the best 
interest standard would increase transaction costs and could 
be disastrous. Over the long run, competition in financial 
services has been an inexorable driver of organizational 
innovation, clearly reducing transaction costs to correct the 
revealed shortcomings of existing arrangements and 
dramatically improving investor welfare. In the 1970s and 
‘80s, the brokerage industry sought and achieved the legal 
authority to include binding pre-dispute arbitration clauses 
in client account contracts to ensure clients access to swift 
justice.197 Consumer advocates widely assumed that the 
industry planned to stack the deck against retail investors, 
who would then be even more powerless than before. Yet, a 
detailed 1992 Government Accounting Office report to 
Congress found “no indication of a pro-industry bias” in 
arbitration outcomes.198 
Other important examples of innovation in financial 
services include the breathtaking arrival of money market 
mutual funds, the proliferation of funds with different styles 
and investment objectives, the creation of various market 
indexes to serve as benchmarks for monitoring performance, 
the development of mutual fund ratings, the emergence of 
mutual fund proxy aggregators, the appearance and 
 
197 In Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, the Supreme Court 
held mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses enforceable under the 
Securities & Exchange Act of 1934. 482 U.S. 220, 238 (1987). In 1989, the 
Court held them enforceable under the Securities Act of 1933 in Rodriguez 
de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 481 (1989). 
198 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/GGD-92-74, SECURITIES 
ARBITRATION: HOW INVESTORS FARE 6 (1992). The report also notes that 
accounts allowing margin or options trades were far more likely to provide 
for pre-dispute mandatory arbitration than more simple cash accounts. Id. 
This clearly shows that the patterns of organization in securities 
brokerage are, on this margin, consistent with rational cooperative 
behavior between broker-dealer firms and their retail clients. 
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increasing popularity of index funds, the rise of exchange 
traded funds, the gradual decline of up-front loads, the 
appearance of no-load funds, and what the RBI reports as 
“clean” shares free of sales charges,199 the displacement of 
loads with 12b-1 fees, the increasing use of back-end and 
contingent deferred sales loads that disappear entirely if the 
investor holds shares for a prescribed number of years, and 
so on. It is unsurprising that U.S. retirement savers have 
experienced investment returns over the past fifty years far 
in excess of most other countries across the globe,200 or that 
the U.S. has been the leading exporter of financial 
innovation. 
The notion that private contracting in the retail 
brokerage industry must be prohibited because most 
investors appear ignorant or confused suffers from the fatal 
conceit of central planning, which is that the market is 
incapable of performing well unless it is designed, 
rationalized, and administered by a committee of experts.201 
While the securities laws enable the SEC to make expert 
judgments to protect investors, the efficiency, competition, 
capital formation requirement constrains its ability to do so 
unless it can provide convincing empirical evidence that the 
benefits are likely to exceed the costs. Where the data 
necessary to do plausible CBA are unavailable, the Coasean 
approach provides a theoretically sound and empirically 
tractable alternative reflecting “the best reasonably 
obtainable scientific, technical, economic, and other 
information concerning the need for, and consequences of, 
the intended regulation.”202 
 
199  Regulation Best Interest, 83 Fed. Reg. at 21,583. 
200 See Alberto R. Musalem & Ricardo Pasquini, Private Pension 
Systems: Cross-Country Investment Performance (World Bank, Discussion 
Paper No. 1214, 2012), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/SOCIAL 
PROTECTION/Resources/SP-Discussion-papers/Pensions-DP/1214.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2FLT-Z9QR]. 
201 See FRIEDRICH AUGUST HAYEK, THE FATAL CONCEIT: THE ERRORS OF 
SOCIALISM 86–87 (W.W. Bartley, III ed., 1991). 
202 Supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
